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The New Peonage
Tamar R. Birckhead ∗
Abstract
Although the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution
formally abolished slavery and involuntary servitude in 1865, the
text created an exception for the punishment of crimes “whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted.” Two years later, Congress
passed The Anti-Peonage Act in an attempt to prohibit the practice
of coerced labor for debt. Yet, in the wake of the Civil War,
Southern states innovated ways to impose peonage but avoid
violations of the law, including criminal surety statutes that
allowed employers to pay the court fines for indigent
misdemeanants charged with minor offenses in exchange for a
commitment to work. Surplus from these payments padded public
coffers (as well as the pockets of court officials), and when workers’
debt records were subsequently “lost” or there was an allegation of
breach, surety contracts were extended, and workers became
further indebted to local planters and merchants. Several decades
later in Bailey v. Alabama (1911) and United States v. Reynolds
(1914), the Supreme Court invalidated laws criminalizing simple
contractual breaches, which Southern states had used to skirt the
general provisions of the Anti-Peonage Act. Yet, these decisions
ultimately had little impact on the “ever-turning wheel of
servitude,” and the practice persisted under alternative forms
until after World War II.
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This Article examines the phenomenon of what the Author
calls “the new peonage.” It posits that the reconfiguration of the
South’s judicial system after the Civil War, which entrapped
blacks in a perpetual cycle of coerced labor, has direct parallels to
the two-tiered system of justice that exists in our juvenile and
criminal courtrooms of today. Across the United States, even
seemingly minor criminal charges trigger an array of fees, court
costs, and assessments that can create insurmountable debt
burdens for already struggling families. Likewise, parents who
fall behind on their child support payments face the risk of
incarceration, and upon release from jail, they must pay off the
arrears that accrued, which hinders the process of reentry.
Compounding such scenarios, criminal justice debt can lead to
driver’s license suspension, bank account or wage garnishment,
extended supervision until debts are paid, additional court
appearances or warrants related to debt collection and
nonpayment, and extra fines and interest for late payment. When
low-income parents face such collateral consequences, the very act
of meeting the most basic physical and emotional needs of their
children becomes a formidable challenge, the failure of which can
trigger the intervention of Child Protective Services, potential
neglect allegations, and further court hearings and fees. For youth
in the juvenile court system, mandatory fees impose a burden that
increases the risk of recidivism. In short, for families caught
within the state’s debt-enforcement regime, the threat of
punishment is an ever-present specter, and incarceration always
looms. Ironically, rather than having court fees serve as a
straightforward revenue source for the state, this hidden
regressive tax requires an extensive infrastructure to turn court
and correctional officials into collection agents, burdening the
system and interfering with the proper administration of justice.
Moreover, states frequently divert court fees and assessments to
projects that have little connection to the judicial system.
This Article is the first to analyze the ways in which the
contemporary justice tax has the same societal impact as post-Civil
War peonage: Both function to maintain an economic caste system.
The Article opens with two case profiles to illustrate the legal
analysis in narrative form, followed by several others presented
throughout the piece. The Article then chronicles the legal history
of peonage from the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment
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through the early twentieth century. It establishes the parallels to
the present-day criminal justice system, in which courts
incarcerate or re-incarcerate those who cannot pay. It argues that
Supreme Court decisions intended to end the use of debtors’
prisons ultimately had limited impact. The Article concludes with
proposals for legislative and public policy reform of the new
peonage, including data collection and impact analysis of fines,
restitution, and user fees; ending incarceration and extended
supervision for non-willful failure to pay; and establishing the
right to counsel in nonpayment hearings.
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I. Introduction

“[He] is thus kept chained to an ever-turning wheel of
servitude. . . .”
United States v. Reynolds 1
In the 1860s, an African-American man whom I will call
Marcus 2 was born into slavery on a plantation in Elberton,
Georgia. 3 Shortly after the end of the Civil War, Marcus was
emancipated, and at age ten, he was hired to work picking cotton
for the owner of the plantation, known as the Captain. 4 Although
Marcus had no formal education and rarely left the plantation,
the conditions under which he lived during his youth were
tolerable. 5 When he turned twenty-one, Marcus agreed to enter
into a one-year labor contract with the Captain, earning $3.50
each week and living in a one-room log cabin. 6 He married one of
the Captain’s house-servants, Mandy, and they lived in a two-room
shanty. 7
After several years, during which Marcus renewed his
contract annually, the Captain died, and his son—called the
Senator after entering elected office in Atlanta—took over the
plantation. 8 At the Senator’s suggestion, Marcus signed a
1. 235 U.S. 133, 147–48 (1914).
2. As the source for this case study is an anonymous, autobiographical
essay appearing in a magazine published in New York in 1904, a name for the
individual has been given for narrative clarity.
3. See The New Slavery in the South—An Autobiography, INDEPENDENT,
Feb. 25, 1904, at 409, (presenting the autobiographical story of an anonymous
African American in the Southern United States during the period following the
Civil War), available at http://docsouth.unc.edu/fpn/negpeon/negpeon.html.
4. See id. (explaining that Marcus’ uncle hired him out to the Captain and
he worked picking cotton).
5. See id. (noting that he had clothes, a place to sleep, ten to fifteen cents
per week for “spending change,” and that he and everybody who worked there
“was happy”).
6. See id. at 410 (“When I reached twenty-one the Captain told me I was a
free man, but he urged me to stay with him. He said he would treat me right,
and pay me as much as anybody else would. . . . And I stayed.”).
7. See id. (describing how Mandy also worked for the Captain, and after
Marcus and Mandy married he felt like “the biggest man in Georgia”).
8. See id. (noting that the Captain died five years after Marcus had
started annually renewing his contract, resulting in the Senator taking over the
property).
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ten-year contract, and not long after, the state began leasing out
convicted men to work on the plantation. 9 The Senator paid the
state $200 annually for each man’s labor, housed them in
stockades, and kept them in shackles as they worked under the
supervision of armed guards provided by the state. 10 Although
Marcus and the other free laborers were frightened by these
developments, they understood that they had no choice but to
fulfill their ten-year contracts. 11 After Marcus’s contract expired,
however,the Senator told him that he had incurred $165 worth of
debt at the plantation commissary, where free laborers were
compelled to buy all their necessities, including food and
clothing. 12 Marcus then learned that his contract required that
his debt—and that of the other free laborers—had to be paid off
by hard labor; he was placed in the stockade with the leased
prisoners and forced to work from sunrise to sunset with little
food or rest, under the constant threat of physical punishment. 13
Meanwhile, Mandy became a slave “mistress” 14 for one of the
9. See id. (explaining how shortly after Marcus signed a ten-year contract,
the Senator built a shanty, which “looked for all the world like stalls for horses”
and then brought in “prisoners who had been leased by the Senator from the
State of Georgia”).
10. See id. (“[The prisoners] were quartered in the long, low shanty,
afterward called the stockade . . . .leased by the Senator . . . at about $200 each
year, the State agreeing to pay for guards and physicians, for necessary
inspection . . . and all other incidental camp expenses.”).
11. See id. at 410–11 (describing how the laborers met with the intention of
quitting, but learned that if they did not fulfill their contracts they would face
consequences such as being locked in the stockades, “run down by bloodhounds,”
or “beat[en] brutally”).
12. See id. at 411 (“[The Senator] had established a large store, which was
called the commissary. All of us free laborers were compelled to buy our
supplies . . . from that store.”).
13. See id. at 411–12 (“Really, we had made ourselves lifetime slaves, or
peons, as the law called us. But, call it slavery, peonage, or what not, the truth
is we lived in a hell on earth what time we spent in the Senator’s peon camp.”).
14. Using the term “mistress” in this context can be misleading, as Mandy
was likely coerced into the role under threat of violence; it is, however, the term
used by the author of the essay, id. at 412, so it is presented as a direct quote
here. See also Margaret Sullivan, Times Regrets ‘Slave Mistress’ in Julian
Bond’s Obituary, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://public
editor.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/20/times-regrets-slave-mistress-in-julianbonds-obituary/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (“Retiring this phrase [‘slave
mistress’] and expressing regret about using it has nothing to do with political
correctness. It’s about recognizing the history of slavery in America, at a time
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white male supervisors at the camp, and Marcus’s nine-year-old
son was given away to a black family across the river in South
Carolina. 15 After three years, the white man who was now living
with Mandy told Marcus that he was being released; he drove
Marcus into South Carolina and told him to “git,” leaving him
penniless, with a pair of overalls as his only possession. 16
Eventually Marcus made his way to Birmingham, Alabama,
where he worked in coal mines and smelted iron. 17
By 1904, when Marcus published his autobiography in a New
York magazine, the Captain’s convict or “peon” camp was one of
six or seven that leased prisoners from the state. 18 Throughout
Georgia, blacks as well as whites were held in similar conditions
to pay off debts they had allegedly incurred:
[T]here are hundreds and hundreds of farms all over the State
where negroes, and in some cases poor white folks, are held in
bondage on the ground that they are working out debts, or
where the contracts which they have made hold them in a kind
of perpetual bondage, because under those contracts, they may
not quit one employer and hire out to another, except by and
with the knowledge and consent of the former employer. One
of the usual ways to secure laborers for a large peonage camp
is for the proprietor to send out an agent to the little courts in
the towns and villages, and where a man charged with some
petty offense has no friends or money the agent will urge him
to plead guilty, with the understanding that the agent will pay
his fine, and in that way save him from the disgrace of being
sent to jail or the chain-gang! For this high favor, the man
must sign beforehand a paper signifying his willingness to go
to the farm and work out the amount of the fine imposed.
When he reaches the farm, he has to be fed and clothed, to be
sure, and these things are charged up to his account. By the
when race is at the forefront of the nation’s consciousness. Language matters.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
15. See The New Slavery in the South—An Autobiography, supra note 3, at
412 (“[M]y wife was still kept for a while in the ‘Big House,’ but my little boy,
who was only nine years old, was given away to a negro family across the river
in South Carolina, and I never saw or heard of him after that.”).
16. Id. at 414.
17. See id. (describing how Marcus “begged [his] way to Columbia” and was
hired to work in a coal mine in Birmingham, Alabama and “reckon[s] [he’ll] die
either in a coal mine or an iron furnace” but stated that “[e]ither is better than a
Georgia peon camp”).
18. Id. at 413.
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time he has worked out his first debt, another is hanging over
his head, and so on and so on, by a sort of endless chain for an
indefinite period, as in every case the indebtedness is
arbitrarily arranged by the employer. In many cases it is very
evident that the court officials are in collusion with the
proprietors or agents, and that they divide the “graft” among
themselves. 19

More than a century later on the opposite coast in
Washington State, David Ramirez struggled to cope with the
fallout from criminal-justice debt that he had incurred a decade
earlier. 20 In 2003, David pled guilty to a single count of
residential burglary after entering the home of his ex-wife
without her permission. 21 The court ordered him to pay $2,144 in
restitution and over $1,147 in penalties and costs. 22 At the time
he was earning only $10 per hour, and was also required to pay
$500 a month in child support. 23 A couple of years later, because
of medical problems and a lax economy, David lost his job and
was receiving public assistance when he missed a court-ordered
payment, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. 24 To have the
warrant lifted, David had to pay the full amount owed plus an
additional $100 “warrant fee” for a total of $800. 25 Unable to
afford counsel, David lived in fear of arrest for a year until a
lawyer from his church helped him negotiate a lower payment;
after borrowing money, he was finally able to have the warrant
lifted. 26
Since then, David has resumed a reasonable payment plan
and has not missed a payment, but it has not been easy. 27 He
19.
20.

Id.
See ACLU OF WASH. & COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVS., MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’
PRISONS: THE WAYS COURT-IMPOSED DEBTS PUNISH PEOPLE FOR BEING POOR 13–
14 (2014) (describing the repercussions from criminal-justice debt incurred as a
result of a felony after more than a decade).
21. Id. at 13.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See id. (describing how a warrant was issued for David’s arrest in 2008
after he missed a payment due to being unemployed and on public assistance).
25. Id.
26. See id. (“[David] basically lived in fear of arrest for a year until a
lawyer in [his] church agreed to help [him] negotiate a lower payment to quash
the warrant.”).
27. See id. (explaining that David pays $30 per month toward his
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supports his four children, and the family relies on $400 a month
in public assistance and food stamps. 28 David often must choose
between paying his fines and meeting his family’s needs, such as
paying the utility bills or buying winter coats for his children. 29
His current debt balance of $1,839 is composed solely of interest,
which continues to accrue and will take him another five years to
pay off. 30 He described his situation in stark terms:
The message the courts have sent to me over and over again is
that if I don’t pay in full every month, I’ll go to jail and I’ll lose
everything. I’ve had judges tell me that they don’t care what
my other obligations are [because] LFOs [legal financial
obligations] come first: first before food and shelter. It doesn’t
matter what the family suffers, so long as the court gets
paid. 31

Across the United States, even minor criminal charges, such
as loitering, littering, and unpaid traffic tickets, trigger an array
of fees, court costs, and assessments in both juvenile and criminal
courts. 32 These fees can create insurmountable debt burdens for
already struggling families. 33 One might think that the Supreme
Court had effectively created a barrier against such charges in a
series of cases beginning in 1970, when the Court concluded that
extending a prison term for an inability to pay criminal-justice
debt violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause in Williams v. Illinois. 34 In 1971, the Court found it
criminal-justice debt, but because he is unemployed and has four children even
the $30 per month can be difficult).
28. Id.
29. See id. at 14 (“Sometimes, [David] ha[s] to choose between paying the
electricity bill and paying [legal financial obligations], or between buying [his]
kid a winter coat and paying [legal financial obligations].”
30. Id. (“[David] ha[s] a balance of $1,838.74, and that’s exactly what [he]
owe[s] in interest.”
31. Id.
32. See MITALI NAGRECHA ET AL., WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS, FINING THE FAMILY
4 (2013) (“This debt may range from money owed to a public defender
(oxymoronic as this may seem) to fines, surcharges, and fees assessed at the
time of sentencing and post-sentencing, such as victim restitution, court costs,
and parole fees.”).
33. See id. (“These fees and fines add up to a significant financial burden
for mostly low-income defendants and are administered without much regard
for an individual’s ability to pay.”).
34. See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1970) (finding
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unconstitutional to impose a fine as a sentence and automatically
convert it into a jail term when the defendant cannot afford to
pay the fine in Tate v. Short. 35 Then in 1983, the Court barred the
revocation of probation for failure to pay a fine without first
inquiring into a person’s ability to pay in Bearden v. Georgia. 36
Yet, jurisdictions continue to ignore or “skirt the edges” of these
requirements and consider almost every failure to pay willful. 37
Some courts even impose a “fines or time” alternative sentence
that forces defendants to “choose” between jail and immediate
payment in full. 38
For low-income families, criminal-justice debt can lead to
driver’s license suspension, bank account or wage garnishment,
extended supervision until debts are paid, additional court
appearances or warrants related to debt collection and
nonpayment, and extra fines and interest for late payment. 39
“impermissible discrimination” where imprisonment exceeds the statutory limit
and results due to “involuntary nonpayment of a fine”); see also infra Part III.A
(discussing the facts and holding of Williams v. Illinois as part of an
examination of criminal-justice debt and constitutional constraints the Supreme
Court has found).
35. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) (finding it unconstitutional
to “impos[e] a fine as a sentence and then automatically [convert] it into a jail
term because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in
full”).
36. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983) (“We hold, therefore,
that in revocation proceedings for failure to pay a fine or restitution, a
sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay.’’); see also
infra Part III.A (discussing the facts and holding of Bearden v. Georgia as part
of an examination of criminal-justice debt case law and related constitutional
restraints).
37. See ALICIA BANNON ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO
REENTRY 20 (2010) (examining how interviews with defendants and court
personnel showed that many jurisdictions imprison defendants for unpaid debts
without inquiring into ability to pay, or wait until after arrest or jail to put forth
an inquiry).
38. See, e.g., ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’
PRISONS 23–24 (2010) (discussing a municipal court in New Orleans where
judges regularly offer defendants one of two choices: either pay a fine or face
time in jail).
39. See, e.g., NAGRECHA ET AL., supra note 32, at 28–29 (“The frustration of
debt obligations is not simply aimed . . . at the [child support] arrears that
accumulate in prison that no amount of prison wages at existing levels can
reduce; it is also about the continued financial obligations that individuals face
once released.”); see also infra Part III.C (examining how parents with criminal
justice debt face unique hardships, from difficulties renting to an increased
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When parents face such collateral consequences, the very act of
meeting the most basic physical and emotional needs of one’s
children can become a formidable challenge. 40 Failure to meet
those needs can trigger the intervention of Child Protective
Services, potential neglect allegations, and further court hearings
and fees. 41 For non-custodial parents, failure to pay child support
can lead to time in jail, and the debt often continues to accrue
during the period of incarceration, making it nearly impossible
for the parent to become current. 42
For youth in the juvenile court system, mandatory attorney
fees, detention fees, restitution fines, and supervision fees impose
burdens that increase the risk of recidivism. 43 When these
circumstances are exacerbated by aggravating factors such as
developmental delays, substance abuse, or mental illness,
likelihood of problems for their children).
40. See infra Part III.C (examining how parents with criminal-justice debt
face unique hardships, including difficulties renting and affording clothing for
their children).
41. See, e.g., Candra Bullock, Comment, Low-Income Parents Victimized by
Child Protective Services, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 1023, 1043–44
(2003) (discussing a case where child services removed two children from their
father’s care when he could not afford to pay the electric bill, and the
subsequent Illinois court case finding that neglect due to impoverishment
should not so easily lead to a loss of parental rights); James Herbie DiFonzo,
Parental Responsibility for Juvenile Crime, 80 OR. L. REV. 1, 92–96 (2001)
(explaining that findings of parental neglect or abuse as well as failing to
comply with court orders can lead to the removal of the child from the parent’s
custody).
42. See NAGRECHA ET AL., supra note 32, at 4 (“We include child support
debt as part of criminal-justice debt because it often accrues while individuals
are incarcerated and unable to pay.”).
43. See Stacy Hoskins Haynes et al., Juvenile Economic Sanctions: An
Analysis of their Imposition, Payment, and Effect on Recidivism, 13
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 31, 37–38 (2014) (describing studies showing that
burdens imposed by economic sanctions “might interfere with a juvenile’s ability
to reenter society successfully after a conviction, thereby increasing the risk of
recidivism”); R. Barry Ruback, The Benefits and Costs of Economic Sanctions:
Considering the Victim, the Offender, and Society, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1796,
1811–12 (2015) (explaining that failure to make payments of court fees, fines, or
restitution can lead to probation or incarceration and that the imposition of
economic sanctions can make it difficult for offenders, including juveniles, to
avoid recidivism); see also infra Part III.B (finding that because juveniles often
do not have the means to pay fines and their parents lack the resources to assist
them (and can face garnishment of wages for their children’s fees), it can be
difficult if not impossible for juveniles to avoid recidivism).
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families without extensive support networks have little chance of
succeeding. 44 In short, for children and their parents who are
caught within the State’s debt-enforcement regime, the threat of
punishment is an ever-present specter, and incarceration always
looms. 45
One of the inherent ironies of criminal-justice debt is that
rather than serving as a straightforward revenue source for the
state, juvenile and criminal justice system fees require an
extensive infrastructure to turn court and correctional officials
into collection agents. 46 This hidden regressive tax, therefore,
burdens the system and actually interferes with the proper
administration of justice. 47 Moreover, states frequently divert
court fees and assessments to projects that have little connection
to the judicial system. 48
Although the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution
formally abolished slavery and involuntary servitude in 1865, the
text created an exception for the punishment for crimes “whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted.” 49 It also explicitly
provided for enactment of supplemental legislation to enforce the
44. See NAGRECHA ET AL., supra note 32, at 19–20 (explaining that
individuals must often heavily rely on family and friends for help making
payments).
45. See infra Part III.B (discussing difficulties imposed on juveniles who
face legal financial obligations).
46. See, e.g., ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 38, at 9 (explaining how
utilizing court and correctional officers for collections cost money and may be
“cost-ineffective”); see also infra Part III.D (explaining that the costs of
employing individuals to collect fines and fees and enforce non-payment often
results in little to no money flowing into the judiciary).
47. See ROOPAL PATEL & MEGHNA PHILIP, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A
TOOLKIT FOR ACTION 6 (2012) (“Judges are no longer able to act as impartial
adjudicators if they are forced to act as collection agents. . . . As crime rates
fluctuate, perverse policy incentives could develop.”).
48. See id. (“This undermines the separation of powers by forcing courts to
act as fundraisers for other programs or agencies created by the legislature or
executives.”); see also infra Part III.D (examining the widespread practice of
states putting money obtained through legal financial obligations into general
coffers rather than funding programs meant to decrease crime and lower
recidivism).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; see also Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va.
790, 796 (1871) (describing convicts as “for the time being a slave of the State.
He is civiliter mortus; and his estate, if he has any, is administered like that of a
dead man”).
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amendment’s substantive provisions. 50 Two years later, Congress
passed the Anti-Peonage Act 51 in an attempt to prohibit the
practice of coerced labor for debt. 52 Yet, in the wake of the Civil
War, Southern states innovated ways to continue to reap many of
the economic and labor market benefits of chattel slavery by
enacting a network of criminal and penal statutes that effectively
turned over convicted defendants—most of them newly freed
slaves—to private employers, whether plantation owners or
industrial corporations, ostensibly to “pay off” their criminal
debts through enforced labor. 53 Among the innovations were
criminal surety statutes that allowed employers to pay the court
fines for indigent misdemeanants charged with readily
manufactured crimes, such as vagrancy, adultery, and use of
offensive language, in exchange for a commitment to work. 54
Surplus from these payments padded public coffers (as well as
the pockets of court officials), and when workers’ debt records
were subsequently “lost” or there was an allegation of breach,
surety contracts were extended and workers became further
indebted to local planters and merchants. 55
50. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation.”).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012) (originally enacted as the Peonage Abolition
Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 187, § 1, 14 Stat. 546) (providing the civil components of
the Anti-Peonage Act); 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2012) (originally enacted as Criminal
Code, § 269) (providing the criminal penalties of the Anti-Peonage Act).
52. Peonage is “a status or condition of compulsory service, based upon the
indebtedness of the peon to the master. The basal fact is indebtedness. . . . Upon
this is based a condition of compulsory service.” Clyatt v. United States, 197
U.S. 207, 215 (1905).
53. See Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51
VAND. L. REV. 881, 921 (1998) (exploring “Black Codes” that were passed in
Southern states that maintained “the substance, if not the form, of black
bondage”); see also infra Part II.A (discussing “Black Codes” in Southern states
and failures following the Civil War to dismantle such codes and implement
laws that allowed for equal treatment of African Americans).
54. Klarman, supra note 53, at 922–23, 927; see also United States v.
Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 146 (1914) (“This labor is performed under the constant
coercion and threat of another possible arrest and prosecution in case he
violates the labor contract . . . this form of coercion is as potent as it would have
been had the law provided for the seizure and compulsory service of the
convict.”).
55. See Slavery by Another Name, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/tpt/slavery-byanother-name/themes/peonage/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (examining how
“[t]he paperwork and debt record of individual prisoners was often lost” leading
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Several decades later, the Supreme Court in Bailey v.
Alabama 56 and United States v. Reynolds 57 finally invalidated
laws criminalizing the simple contractual breaches that Southern
states had used to skirt the general provisions of the AntiPeonage Act. 58 Yet, these decisions ultimately had little impact
on the “ever-turning wheel of servitude,” and the practice
persisted under alternative forms until after World War II. 59
This Article examines the phenomenon of what I call “the
new peonage.” The Article is the first to analyze how the
contemporary “justice tax,” faced by people like David Ramirez
and thousands like him, ultimately has the same societal impact
as the post-Civil War practice of peonage: 60 both function to
to “inescapable situations” for black men in the South) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
56. 219 U.S. 219 (1911); see also infra Part II.B (laying out the facts and
analysis in Bailey v. Alabama as part of a discussion on the history of legal
peonage and the path towards findings of unconstitutionality).
57. 235 U.S. 133 (1914); see also infra Part II.B (laying out the facts and
analysis in United States v. Reynolds as part of a discussion on the history of
legal peonage and the path towards findings of unconstitutionality).
58. Klarman, supra note 53, at 922–23 (explaining that Southern states
would criminalize contract breaches through alternate tactics such as “false
pretenses” and “fraudulent intent” laws).
59. See id at 926–30 (“[A]fter Reynolds in 1914, the [Supreme] Court
decided no other peonage cases until World War II, when it finally invalidated
laws from . . . recalcitrant states [such as Florida and Georgia].”); see also infra
Part II.C (explaining how, in “the eight Southern States where more than
seventy-five percent of the black population lived” law enforcement and the
judiciary were complicit in “effectively nullif[ying] anti-peonage legislation and
appellate case decisions”).
60. Although a LexisNexis search found no legal scholarship closely analyzing
the parallels between the post-Civil War system of peonage and the consequences of
contemporary criminal-justice debt, there are a few recently-published law review
articles that examine the consequences of debt resulting from economic sanctions
issued by courts and that explore potential legal strategies for reform. See, e.g.,
Helen A. Anderson, Penalizing Poverty: Making Criminal Defendants Pay for
Their Court-Appointed Counsel Through Recoupment and Contribution, 42 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 323 (2009) (arguing against court-ordered reimbursement,
co-pays, and application fees imposed for indigent criminal defense); Ann
Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization
of Debt, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 349 (2012) (focusing on bars to voting resulting
from unpaid criminal debt); Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines
Clause, 102 CAL. L. REV. 277 (2014) (providing a detailed analysis of colonial and
early American statutory and court records regarding fines, and arguing that
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment should be interpreted to
provide greater individual protections); Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Paying for Your
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maintain an economic caste system. Utilizing paradigmatic as
well as narrative modes of expression, 61 including case profiles, 62
it posits that the reconfiguration of the South’s judicial system
after the Civil War, which entrapped African Americans in a
Time: How Charging Inmates Fees Behind Bars May Violate the Excessive Fines
Clause, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 319 (2014) (arguing that fees charged to inmates
for room and board, work release, physical examinations, dental visits,
medication, medical treatment, and other goods and services may violate the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and recommending litigation
strategies for advocates); Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political
Economy of Application Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2045 (2006) (exploring the impact of application fees for appointed counsel
in criminal cases); see also Vern Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual
Debtor—and a Modest Proposal to Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH.
U. L. REV. 809, 826–27 (1983) (comparing changes to the bankruptcy code by the
consumer credit industry as the equivalent of a return to post-Civil War
peonage practice); Karen Gross, The Debtor as Modern Day Peon: A Problem of
Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 165 (1990) (assessing
whether the bankruptcy laws implicate the Thirteenth Amendment through the
peonage laws); Kate Levine, Note, If You Cannot Afford a Lawyer: Assessing the
Constitutionality of Massachusetts’s Reimbursement Statute, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 191, 202–08 (2007) (discussing the rapid devolution of the right to
counsel for indigent defendants once states were able to charge them attorney
fees). Beyond the legal academy, sociologists and criminologists have conducted
empirical research on the impact of monetary sanctions imposed by courts. See,
e.g., Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social
Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 AMER. J. SOC. 1753 (2010)
(finding that monetary sanctions are imposed on a substantial majority of the
millions of people convicted of crimes annually, and that this indebtedness
reproduces disadvantage by reducing family income and increasing the
likelihood of ongoing criminal justice involvement).
61. See J EROME BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE W ORLDS 11–13 (1986)
(discussing the two modes of cognitive functioning: the paradigmatic or
logico-scientific one that relies on abstract analysis and principled
hypotheses, and the narrative one that leads instead to “good stories,
gripping drama, believable (though not necessarily ‘true’) historical accounts”);
see also Gregory S. Berns et al., Short- and Long-Term Effects of a Novel on
Connectivity in the Brain, 3 BRAIN CONNECTIVITY 590 (2013) (finding that
reading narratives has both a short- and long-term effect on the biology of the
brain, and that reading a novel may cause changes in resting-state connectivity
of the brain that persists for at least a few days); Paul J. Zak, Why Your Brain
Loves Good Storytelling, HARV. BUS. REV. BLOG (Oct. 28, 2014),
https://hbr.org/2014/10/why-your-brain-loves-good-storytelling/ (last visited Nov.
11, 2015) (finding, based on the neurobiology of storytelling, that characterdriven stories with emotional content result in a better understanding of the
writer or speaker’s thesis) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
62. See supra notes 20–31 and accompanying text (discussing David
Ramirez); infra notes 255–270, 291–300 and accompanying text (describing case
profiles).
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perpetual cycle of coerced labor, has direct parallels in the
two-tiered system of justice that exists in the juvenile and
criminal courtrooms of today. Part II of the Article chronicles
the legal history of peonage and the development of alternative
mechanisms for coercing black labor after the passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment and the Black Codes through the early
twentieth century. 63 Part III establishes the parallels to the
present-day criminal justice system and argues that
contemporary Supreme Court decisions intended to end the use of
debtors’ prisons ultimately had limited impact. 64 This analysis
and the analogy to post-Civil War peonage does not depend upon
a demonstration that the legislative motives during these two
eras are precisely the same; it is enough to underscore the similar
impact of the contemporary system in trapping momentarily
errant individuals in an unyielding web of legal strictures. Part
III also highlights the collateral consequences of criminal-justice
debt for families as well as the fiscal impact and social costs that
criminal-justice fees have on states. 65 Part IV advances several
commonsense proposals to end the phenomenon of the new
peonage, beginning with data collection and impact analysis of
fines, restitution, and user fees. 66 It also considers proposals to
establish the right to counsel in nonpayment hearings that can
lead to incarceration or an extension of probation or parole, and it
emphasizes the import of having states focus on rehabilitation
through job training and placement, rather than the collection of
criminal-justice fees or compulsory community service that
interferes with employment. Part V concludes the Article. 67
II. Legal History of Peonage
With the end of the Civil War and the passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment, slavery ceased to be a formal system of
labor control, but this dramatic political and legal change did not
have much effect on the fundamental attitudes of dispossessed
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See infra Part II (Legal History of Peonage).
See infra Part III (The New Peonage).
See infra Part III (The New Peonage).
See infra Part IV (Proposals for Reform).
See infra Part V (Conclusion).
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slave owners. 68 The subsequent creation of the “Black Codes” and
the development of the system of peonage were undergirded by
the belief of most Southern whites that they had a “proprietary
interest in black labor and that blacks would not work unless
coerced to do so.” 69 As a result, slavery was replaced by the
equally effective system of peonage. 70 Although the latter lacked
the extreme brutality and unyielding violence characterized by
the former, the degradation that it unleashed upon the
individual—at least in economic terms—was comparable. 71
Moreover, neither the federal government nor state legislatures
put up much resistance to the shift from one system to another,
enabling local court systems to actively “perpetuate the
substance, if not the form, of black bondage.” 72 As historian
Douglas A. Blackmon has explained:
By 1900, the South’s judicial system had been wholly
reconfigured to make one of its primary purposes the coercion
of African Americans. . . . Sentences were handed down by
provincial judges, local mayors, and justices of the peace—
often men in the employ of white business owners who relied
on the forced labor produced by the judgments. Dockets and
trial records were inconsistently maintained. Attorneys
were rarely involved on the side of blacks. Revenues from
the neo-slavery poured the equivalent of tens of millions of
dollars into the treasuries of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana,
Georgia, Florida, Texas, North Carolina, and South Carolina. 73

68. See DANIEL A. NOVAK, THE WHEEL OF SERVITUDE: BLACK FORCED LABOR
AFTER SLAVERY 1–3 (1978) (explaining that the South had “no intention of
dealing with a truly free black labor force,” reflected by legislation that
implemented criminal penalties for breach of labor contracts, gave rewards for
law enforcement officers who returned black “laborers,” and imposed criminal
penalties for “enticement of a servant”).
69. Klarman, supra note 53, at 928.
70. See NOVAK, supra note 68, at XV (“Without fanfare the freed slave was
plunged into a new labor system [peonage] that degraded his value as a worker
and made his new freedom a mockery, in economic terms at least.”).
71. See e.g., The New Slavery in the South—An Autobiography, supra note
3 (“Really, we had made ourselves lifetime slaves, or peons, as the law called us.
But, call it slavery, peonage, or what not, the truth is we lived in a hell on earth
what time we spent in the Senator’s peon camp.”).
72. Klarman, supra note 53, at 921.
73. DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT
OF B LACK A MERICANS FROM THE C IVIL W AR TO W ORLD W AR II 7–8 (2008).
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Part II chronicles this legacy. 74
A. The Black Codes

In 1864, the end of the Civil War meant four million newly
freed slaves were released into a struggling economy. 75 The war
had disrupted the South’s industry and destroyed much of its
property, and emancipated men were leaving plantations in
droves. 76 From the perspective of white farmers, merchants, and
businessman, there was no clear mechanism for maintaining
racial control while simultaneously reviving the economy and
minimizing opportunities for active resistance or rebellion by
former slaves. 77 With the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment
in 1865, tensions increased. 78
During the period of Reconstruction from 1863 to 1877,
supervision by the federal government initially increased and
then gradually lessened, eventually leaving the South free from
interference except for the basic requirement that emancipation
occur. 79 While this period brought ostensibly “new” state
legislatures and administrators, in reality these were the same
men who had run, or at least reflected the values of, the Old
South. 80 For example, in its first postwar constitutional
74.
75.

See infra Part II (The New Peonage).
See generally, e.g., ANTOINETTE G. VAN ZELM, TENNESSEE CIVIL WAR
NATIONAL HERITAGE AREA, HOPE WITHIN A WILDERNESS OF SUFFERING: THE
TRANSITION FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION
IN
TENNESSEE,
http://www.tn4me.org/pdf/Transition
fromSlaverytoFreedom.pdf.
76. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 27 (2010) (laying out the conditions and mindset
which existed in the Southern States immediately following the Civil War).
77. See id. (“Without the labor of former slaves, the region’s economy would
surely collapse, and without the institution of slavery, there was no longer a
formal mechanism for maintaining racial hierarchy and preventing
‘amalgamation’ with a group of people considered intrinsically inferior and
vile.”).
78. See generally NOVAK, supra note 68.
79. See NOVAK, supra note 68, at 1 (“Reconstruction left the South
relatively free from interference from the federal government, save for the
requirement that emancipation take place.”).
80. See id. at 1–2 (“Therefore, shortly after the end of the war, the
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convention, Mississippi was guided by the following articulation
of its mission:
The institution of slavery having been destroyed . . . the
legislature at its next session . . . shall provide by law for the
protection and security of the person and property of the
freedmen of the State, and guard them and the State against
any evils that may arise from their sudden emancipation. 81

As a result, the laws passed during this “reconstructed” period of
the Confederacy in 1865 and 1866 clearly reflected the fact that
the South had “no intention of dealing with a truly free black
labor force.” 82 The Black Codes and the subsequent system of
peonage or “debt slavery” were designed to fill the gap. 83
The Black Codes of 1865–1867, although short-lived and
characterized by racially discriminatory terminology, presaged
the system of peonage as the South’s answer to the Thirteenth
Amendment. 84 For instance, “An Act to Confer Civil Rights on
Freedmen,” passed in Mississippi in 1865, barred blacks from
renting land and farming on their own outside city limits;
required every freedman to enter into a labor contract or face
vagrancy charges; mandated arrest for breach of contract
“without good cause”; prevented blacks from leaving one employ
for another by imposing civil and criminal penalties for attempts
to “entice” a laborer from his master; imposed criminal penalties
for such malleable offenses as running away, displaying lewd
behavior, and being an idle or disorderly person; allowed
convicted blacks to be hired out at auctions in order to pay their
fines and costs; and authorized a “head” tax on all blacks between
the ages of eighteen and sixty, for which failure to pay was
evidence of vagrancy, triggering further penalties. 85
Confederacy had ‘constructed’ itself with new state legislatures and
administrations. It should be made clear, however, that the new legislators
were, by and large, the same men who had run the Old South, or at least they
reflected its values.”).
81. THEODORE BRANTNER WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH 63
(1965).
82. NOVAK, supra note 68, at 2.
83. See id. (arguing that peonage and the Black Codes oppressed recently
emancipated slaves).
84. See id. (“With formal slavery barred, a complex of laws setting up a
system of peonage or debt slavery was formulated to fill the gap.”).
85. See id. at 2–3 (describing the Act to Confer Civil Rights on Freedmen).
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Similar in intent, an Act to regulate “the Domestic Relations
of Persons of Color” was passed in South Carolina in 1865. 86
Under this law, all labor contracts were enforced by sanctions;
laborers needed their master’s written permission to leave the
plantation or have visitors; freedmen could not operate a store or
work as a craftsman without permission of the local justice of the
peace and a fee payment of up to $100; failure to pay a poll tax
was evidence of vagrancy; vagrancy was broadly defined; and a
convicted vagrant could be hired out for the length of the
sentence. 87
The leasing of convict labor also began during this period,
initially to establish some means of control over prisoners, as
most Southern penitentiaries had been destroyed during the
war. 88 In the early 1870s, convict leasing became profitable; it
was reliable and cheap, and by the 1880s, it had reached its
peak. 89 As one Southern senator remarked, “No matter what goes
wrong, you have no labor strike.” 90 As a result, with no means to
pay off their alleged “debts,” prisoners were sold as forced
laborers to lumber camps, brickyards, railroads, farms,
plantations and dozens of corporations throughout the South. 91
During this period, nine Southern states adopted vagrancy laws
and eight enacted convict laws to allow for the leasing of county
prisoners to plantation owners and private companies. 92
86. Id. at 4.
87. See id. at 4–5 (enumerating the restrictions imposed on blacks by the
Domestic Relations of Person of Color Act).
88. See id. at 31 (outlining the inception of convict leasing during the
Reconstruction period, the first leasings “initiated by army commanders in the
South,” and the shift in rationale from the desire to establish a temporary
means of control over formerly-housed convicts to a profitable system of convict
leases).
89. See id. at 32 (“By the mid-1880s the convict lease system had reached
its peak. Convict labor was lauded as reliable and cheap by the happy exponents
of entrepreneurial liberty in the ‘Redeemed’ South.”).
90. Id. at 33.
91. See ALEXANDER, supra note 76, at 31 (describing the custom of selling
prisoners with debts as forced laborers to Southern industries).
92. See WILLIAM COHEN, AT FREEDOM’S EDGE: BLACK MOBILITY AND THE
SOUTHERN WHITE QUEST FOR RACIAL CONTROL, 1861–1915 at 28–33 (1991)
(asserting that the main objective of the convict laws was to “replace the labor
controls of slavery and to limit the mobility of the black labor force” and that
“states sought to control black mobility through the creation of an unobtrusive
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It is notable that during Reconstruction, no Southern states
passed laws that effectively dismantled the labor restrictions
imposed by the Black Codes. 93 Even in those states where what
was derisively termed the “carpet-bagger-ignorant Negro
coalition” was strong, 94 they failed to establish a minimum wage,
provide for oversight of employers’ debt calculations, or offer legal
review of criminal charges brought against emancipated slaves. 95
Instead of directing their energies to labor rights, the
Reconstruction Congress in Washington focused its chief
attention on the broadest and most basic interpretation of civil
rights: ending slavery with the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment; giving full citizenship to blacks with the Civil
Rights Act of 1866; 96 establishing suffrage (at least in theory) for
black men with the Fifteenth Amendment; and making
interference with voting a federal offense and violent
infringement of civil rights a crime within the Ku Klux Klan
Acts. 97
With little Congressional appetite to regulate the coercive
systems of labor that developed during the periods of
Reconstruction and what Southerners termed “Redemption,” 98
legal structure that could be selectively applied”).
93. See id. at 35 (“If laws did not manifest obvious discrimination against
the freedmen, they often survived.”).
94. NOVAK, supra note 68, at 19.
95. See id. at 18 (describing the lack of any legislative efforts resembling
those mentioned in the text, which “were just the sort of legislation which ought
to have come from [state legislatures]”).
96. See CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, 14 STAT. 27 (1866) (amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1991)) (proclaiming that “all persons born in the United States . . . are hereby
declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and
color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary
servitude” shall enjoy equal benefits and burdens of citizenship therein).
97. See ENFORCEMENT ACT, 17 STAT. 13 (1871) (as amended by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1979)) (“Any person who . . . shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any
person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any
[constitutional guarantees] shall . . . be liable to the party injured in any
action . . . or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”). Southern legislatures
also began to address matters related to the implementation of desegregation
and the establishment of public education. NOVAK, supra note 68, at 18–19.
98. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863–1877 at 587–601 (Harper Perennial 2014) (1988); see also Freedom: A
History of the US, A Failed Revolution, PBS (2002), http://www.pbs.org/wnet
/historyofus/web07/segment5_p.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (describing
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sharecropping became the norm for agricultural laborers. 99 After
the war, there was a shortage of cash. Former slaves were
typically paid half in currency, with the other half to be paid only
when the crop was harvested. 100 If basic goods were lent to the
former slave, the employer (a planter or merchant) placed a lien
on the crops, so that even if the crops were abundant enough to
remove the worker’s outstanding debts, he would still need to
borrow again to survive the winter. 101 Under another scenario,
the planter subtracted the costs of food, clothing, and shelter from
the worker’s wages, but because the planter unilaterally set the
value of such goods, the “sentence” could be made to run a year or
more. 102 Moreover, emancipated slaves had little bargaining
power to negotiate the terms of their labor contracts, and
although any breach of contract by the employer was a
punishable offense, very few employers were ever prosecuted
under the statute. 103 Because of “enticement” laws, employers
could not “entice away” another’s employees, and most workers
lacked the means to relocate either within the South or to the
North, the result of Southern white efforts to “circumscribe black
freedom of movement.” 104 Laborers also found themselves trapped
Redemption as a movement during the 1860s–1890s by Southern Democrats
who used the Black Codes, violence, and voter disenfranchisement laws to keep
blacks and Republicans out of power) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
99. See COHEN, supra note 92, at 19 (“As the system developed,
sharecropping began to emerge as the dominant means of organizing Southern
agricultural labor . . . .”).
100. See id. (explaining that after the Civil War there was “an acute
shortage of cash, which led to the rise of an arrangement whereby the workers
agreed to accept as wages a portion of the crop to be distributed at the end of the
season”).
101. See NOVAK, supra note 68, at 19 (describing the establishment of
sharecropping and the rise of the lien instrument as “an instrument by which
[black sharecroppers were] bound to the land”).
102. See id. at 35 (“As the planter set the value of [food, clothing, and
shelter], with a little judicious bookkeeping the sentence could easily be made to
run a year or more.”).
103. See id. at 20 (“Theoretically, the fact that the planter was subject to any
punishment for breach of contract was an advancement over the provision in the
Black Codes. As a practical matter, it had little meaning, since employers were
simply not prosecuted under the statute.”).
104. See COHEN, supra note 92, at xiii (explaining that a foundational goal of
his book was to tell the story of black mobility “against the background of
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within the strictures of the “fine-cost” system, with one study
finding that in a single month in a Georgia county, 149 people
(almost all blacks) were sentenced to a total of nineteen years of
labor for “crimes no more serious than walking on the grass or
spitting on the sidewalk.” 105
In short, during Reconstruction, “the newly freed agricultural
worker was, by consensus, placed in a position of peonage,” 106
with the laws themselves—affirmed by the local courts—ensuring
this result. Because every state had a provision in its constitution
barring imprisonment for debt, the validity of these laws relied
on the argument that fraudulent intent—or having false
pretenses—when entering into the contract was the object of the
penalty, rather than the breach itself. 107 In this way, courts
asserted that the peonage system was not the equivalent of
involuntary servitude because although the employer could not
force the worker to stay, the worker could be punished for
leaving. 108 This conclusion was supported by the fact that the
laws stipulated that the mere failure to adhere to the contract
was presumptive evidence of false pretenses or fraud at its
inception. 109 Of course, “[t]his assessment ignored the fact that
the statute provided that imprisonment did not relieve the debt;
punishment could continue indefinitely until the contract
provisions had been met.” 110
For decades after the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment,
the federal government did nothing to stop the progress of
southern white efforts to circumscribe black freedom of movement” through the
use of labor-control laws).
105. See NOVAK, supra note 68, at 35 (discussing the findings of Judge
Emory Speer, a “bitter opponent of peonage” whose personal survey of the Bibb
County, Georgia court records found the results displayed in the accompanying
text).
106. Id. at 28.
107. See id. at 38 (“This interpretation (punishing fraud rather than breach),
is absolutely vital to the validity of these laws, for every state had a provision in
its constitution barring imprisonment for debt.”).
108. See id. (detailing the argument by which courts cited the “voluntary”
nature of the system in place, claiming that employers could not prevent
workers from leaving, and thus all employers and courts could do was punish a
worker after the fact).
109. See id. (“Failure to perform the services contracted for was presumptive
evidence of fraud.”).
110. Id. at 39.
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peonage practices. State laws enforcing peonage were not
challenged in the courts, and the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867, aimed
originally at the system of peonage that existed in New Mexico
while under Spanish rule, was rarely, if ever, invoked. 111 By the
early 1900s, however, the Progressive Movement became more
interested in the plight of blacks, including those working under
debt contracts. 112 With new waves of immigration, whites were
brought into the labor pool and made peons, and the U.S. Senate
became motivated to examine the practice. 113 After a lone
Alabama judge declared one of several peonage laws
unconstitutional, 114 the Supreme Court in United States v.
Clyatt 115 acknowledged that peonage unconstitutionally allows for
punishment on the basis of debt. 116 Between 1905 and 1911,
Clyatt opened the way for lower federal courts to find that the
Anti-Peonage Act applied to a wide variety of scenarios. 117 Yet,
states vigorously defended their labor laws and continued to
uphold their contract and enticement laws as valid exercises of
111. See id. at 36, 44 (explaining the origin of the Spanish peonage system
in the New Mexico territory, its incorporation into U.S. law in 1846, and the
subsequent targeting of it by the first anti-peonage legislation).
112. See id. at 46 (explaining the increased interest of the federal
government in “the plight of the Southern peon” at the beginning of the
twentieth century, the rise of the Progressive Movement and the writings of Ray
Stannard Baker, and the “agitation over lynchings of blacks in the South”).
113. See id. (describing the actions of the Senate in examining the United
States Immigration Commission and introducing legislation in favor of
immigrants in response to the trend of white immigrants being subjected to
peonage).
114. See id. at 48–49 (chronicling the holdings of one Judge Thomas G.
Jones in his methodical rejection of peonage laws, culminating in a 1903
decision where he declared an Alabama contract-enticement act
unconstitutional).
115. 197 U.S. 201 (1905).
116. See id. at 215–17 (describing the operation of the peonage system
through “contracting to pay [one’s] indebtedness through labor or servitude” and
discussing the scope of constitutional authority over the system, ultimately
determining that such a system is contravenes the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments); see also NOVAK, supra note 68, at 51 (discussing the
unconstitutionality of peonage through the decisions of several courts).
117. See NOVAK, supra note 68, at 52 (detailing the court’s holding that the
Anti-Peonage Act applies to cases of debtor coercion, employer bribes and fraud,
employer imprisonment and procurement of servants, false accusations of laborers
by employers, and magistrate or officer involvement in knowingly-fraudulent
arrests and convictions).
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state power, setting the stage for the Supreme Court to weigh in,
as it did with Bailey v. Alabama in 1911. 118
B. Bailey v. Alabama and United States v. Reynolds
In Alabama in December, 1907, Alonzo Bailey, a black man,
entered into an annual contract as a farm laborer with the
Riverside Company for twelve dollars a month. 119 He received an
advance of fifteen dollars to be deducted in monthly installments,
but he left after working for six weeks and without returning the
advance. 120 The Riverside Company had Bailey arrested under
the state’s false pretenses law, which allowed for the presumption
of fraudulent intent, and an Alabama evidentiary rule prohibited
laborers indicted under this law to testify to their
Given
these
evidentiary
“uncommunicated
motives.” 121
roadblocks for defendants, it is unsurprising that Bailey was
readily convicted, with the only witness against him being “his
white employer with the contract in his hand—which, by the way,
was an unacknowledged and unwitnessed contract.” 122 Not
having the money, Bailey was sentenced to 136 days of hard
labor: twenty days for the $30 fine plus 116 days to cover his

118. 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
119. See id. at 229 (describing the initial employment agreement entered
into by Bailey).
120. See Bailey, 219 U.S. at 229 (describing the events that led to the case);
see also COHEN, supra note 92, at 288 (“[Bailey] was given an advance of fifteen
dollars to be taken out of his monthly pay. When after working for just over a
month, he left without refunding the advance, the Riverside Company had
Bailey arrested . . . .”).
121. See id. (explaining the “read-in” enforcement of the evidentiary statute,
and its practical effect “that the accused, for the purpose of rebutting the
statutory presumption, shall not be allowed to testify ‘as to his uncommunicated
motives, purpose, or intention’” (quoting Bailey v. State, 161 Ala. 77, 78 (1909))).
The legislatures of Georgia in 1903 and Florida in 1907 passed similar statutes
that allowed for breach of contract to be prima facie evidence of the worker’s
intent to injure or defraud the employer. See PETE DANIEL, THE SHADOW OF
SLAVERY: PEONAGE IN THE SOUTH, 1901–1969 at 67 (1972) (detailing the
development of Southern legislation that facilitated the peonage system).
122. Ray Stannard Baker, A Pawn in the Struggle for Freedom, AM. MAG. 72,
Sept. 1911, at 609.

THE NEW PEONAGE

1619

court costs and lawyers’ fees. 123 As Booker T. Washington said of
the Alabama law at the time:
This simply means that any white man, who cares to charge
that a Colored man has promised to work for him and has not
done so, or who has gotten money from him and not paid it
back, can have the Colored man sent to the chain gang. 124

Bailey unsuccessfully appealed his case to the Alabama
Supreme Court, and by 1911 the case had reached the U.S.
Supreme Court. 125 His lawyers argued that the statute’s true
intent was “to enable the employer to keep the employee in
involuntary servitude by the overhanging menace of
prosecution.” 126 The lawyers representing Alabama argued that
allowing a simple breach of contract to serve as prima facie
evidence of fraud did not “overcome” the absolute presumption of
innocence for all defendants and the rigorous standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. 127 The Court rejected this argument
and held in an opinion by Associate Justice Charles Evans
Hughes that the state could not punish a servant for failure or
refusal to serve out his contract based on the presumption that he
had entered the contract under false pretenses. 128 Although the
Court refused to acknowledge that the law was racially
discriminatory, 129 it recognized that the statute was—in
essence—the legal cornerstone of peonage and invalidated it: 130
123. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 231; COHEN, supra note 92, at 288.
124. DANIEL, supra note 121, at 67.
125. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 231 (1911).
126. COHEN, supra note 92, at 288.
127. See id. at 289 (describing the argument and labeling it as
“disingenuous”).
128. See Bailey, 219 U.S. 244 (“If [the State] cannot punish the servant as a
criminal for the mere failure or refusal to serve without paying his debt, it is not
permitted to accomplish the same result by creating a statutory presumption
which, upon proof of no other fact, exposes him to conviction and punishment.”).
But see Bailey, 219 U.S. at 246 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Breach of a legal
contract without excuse is wrong conduct, even if the contract is for labor, and if
a state adds to civil liability a criminal liability to fine, it simply intensifies the
legal motive for doing right; it does not make the laborer a slave.”).
129. See Bailey, 219 U.S. at 244 (“The statute, on its face, makes no racial
discrimination, and the record fails to show its existence in fact. No question of a
sectional character is presented, and we may view the legislation in the same
manner as if it had been enacted in New York or in Idaho.”).
130. See COHEN, supra note 92, at 289 (“‘[A]lthough the statute in terms is to
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It is the compulsion of the service that the [Alabama] statute
inhibits, for when that occurs the condition of servitude is
created, which would be not less involuntary because of the
original agreement to work out the indebtedness. The contract
exposes the debtor to liability for the loss due to the breach,
but not to enforced labor. 131

Three years later in United States v. Reynolds, 132 the Court, in
an opinion by Associate Justice William R. Day, utilized the same
reasoning and strategy to strike down Alabama’s criminal-surety
statute.133 Ed Rivers, a black man, was convicted in Alabama of
larceny, fined $15 and assessed costs of $43.75. 134 J.A. Reynolds
appeared as a surety for him and paid the amount of the fine and
costs to the state. 135 On May 4, 1910, Rivers contracted with
Reynolds to work as his farmhand for nine months and twentyeight days at the rate of $6 per month in order to pay off the fines
and costs. 136 On June 6th, Rivers quit the job, and was arrested,
charged with violation of a “criminal contract,” convicted, and
fined $87. 137 At this point, Gideon W. Broughton, a neighboring
planter, served as the surety and entered into a similar contract
with Rivers to work as a farmhand for fourteen months to pay off
his fines. 138 Rivers fled from Broughton after a few days,
incurring a new fine of $300 dollars plus $112 in costs, and was
punish fraud, still its natural and inevitable effect is to expose to conviction for
crime those who simply fail or refuse to perform contracts for personal service in
liquidation of a debt.’” (quoting Bailey, 219 U.S. at 231)).
131. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 242 (1911) (emphasis added).
132. 235 U.S. 133 (1914).
133. See id. at 144 (“‘[P]eonage, however created, is compulsory service,
involuntary servitude . . . . A clear distinction exists between peonage and the
voluntary performance of labor or rendering services in payment of debt.’”
(quoting Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 215)). See also id. at 150 (Holmes, J., concurring)
There seems to me nothing in the Thirteenth Amendment or the Revised
Statutes that prevents a state from making a breach of contract, as well a
reasonable contract for labor as for other matters, a crime and punishing
it as such. But impulsive people with little intelligence or foresight may be
expected to lay hold of anything that affords a relief from present pain,
even though it will cause greater trouble by and by.
134. Id. at 139.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 140.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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ultimately sentenced to one year on the chain gang, as it was
apparent that he would not remain on a farm “even when
threatened with continual arrest.” 139 The federal district court
held that this cycle of entrapping Rivers did not violate the AntiPeonage Act and that the Alabama Code justified his punitive
treatment. 140 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that under
such contracts,
labor is performed under the constant coercion and threat of
another possible arrest and prosecution in case he violates the
labor contract which he has made with the surety, and this
form of coercion is as potent as it would have been had the law
provided for the seizure and compulsory service of the
convict. . . . Under this statute, the surety may cause the
arrest of the convict for violation of his labor contract. He may
be sentenced and punished for this new offense, and undertake
to liquidate the penalty by a new contract of a similar nature,
and, if again broken, may be again prosecuted, and the convict
is thus kept chained to an ever-turning wheel of servitude to
discharge the obligation which he has incurred to his surety,
who has entered into an undertaking with the State or paid
money in his behalf. 141

Despite these Supreme Court decisions striking down key
aspects of the practice, peonage continued—not only in Alabama
but throughout the South. 142 The labor contract laws of Georgia
and Florida, for instance, remained on the books for another
thirty years, as did the legal basis for the practice. 143 In a
magazine essay written after Bailey was decided in 1911, the
author characterized Alonzo Bailey as “a mere pawn in the

139. DANIEL, supra note 121, at 26–27.
140. See United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 140–41 (1914) (“The
rulings in the court below upon the plea and demurrers were that there was no
violation of the Federal statutes, properly construed, and also held that the
conduct of the defendants was justified by the provisions of the Alabama Code,
upon which they relied.”).
141. Id. at 146.
142. See DANIEL, supra note 121, at 79 (discussing the continuation and
evolution of Southern peonage after the Reynolds and Bailey decisions).
143. See id. at 80 (“[N]either the Justice Department nor a civil rights or
labor group finished what Bailey’s supporters began in 1911. Peonage continued
to the 1940s and beyond, and the legal basis for the practice endured thirty
years after the precedent-setting Bailey case had been decided.”).
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battle,” and asserted that the eponymous Supreme Court case “is
no final panacea”:
Neither individual men nor races rise merely by decisions or
laws. While so many Negroes are . . . poverty stricken, and
while so many white men are shortsighted enough to take
advantage of this . . . poverty, so long will forms of slavery
prevail . . . . 144

Although there were few thorough investigations or even
approximate estimates of the number of blacks who fell prey to
peonage, there was little doubt that the practice was prevalent
and that it operated to perpetuate black exploitation. 145 A.J.
Hoyt, an investigator for the Department of Justice, sarcastically
remarked in 1907 that in the three states of Georgia, Alabama,
and Mississippi, “investigations will prove that 33 1/3 percent of
the planters operating from five to one hundred plows, are
holding their Negro employees to a condition of peonage, and
arresting and returning those that leave before alleged
indebtedness is paid.” 146 In the same year, a citizen in Florida
remarked, “Slavery is just as much an ‘institution’ now as it was
before the war.” 147
Yet, the perpetuation of such a system would not have been
possible without the complicity of the judicial system, which kept
the wheel of servitude turning. As Langston Hughes wrote in
1931:
144. Baker, supra note 122, at 610.
145. See DANIEL, supra note 121, at 20 (“Documentary evidence of peonage
in the nineteenth century remains sketchy, for few observers were familiar with
what constituted peonage. Yet from travelers’ accounts, official reports,
congressional hearings, and other sources, there is strong evidence that peonage
was no twentieth-century invention.”).
146. Id. at 22, 108–09. Hoyt, of course, was referring to the three-fifths
compromise that was reached between delegates from the South and the North
during the 1787 U.S. Constitutional Convention over how slaves would be
counted when determining a state’s total population for legislative
representation and taxing purposes. See Brooke E. Newborn, Correcting the
Common Misreading of the “Three-Fifths” Clause of the U.S. Constitution:
Clarifying the “Hostile Faction”, 80 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 93, 96–97 (2009) (explaining
the process of arriving at the compromise and the meaning of it). The ultimate
agreement was that persons who were not free, “including those bound to
Service for a Term of Years,” would be counted as “three fifths of all other
Persons.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, ¶ 3.
147. DANIEL, supra note 121, at 22 (emphasis in original).
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That Justice is a blind goddess
Is a thing to which we poor are wise:
Her bandage hides two festering sores
That once, perhaps, were eyes. 148

The next section explores the central role of the Southern judicial
system in sustaining the peonage regime.
C. The Complicity of the Judicial System
By the twentieth century, peonage in the South had
developed into a “confusing mass of customs, legalities, and
pseudo-legalities,” 149 which the judicial system had enabled to
flourish. 150 Despite the Anti-Peonage Act and landmark Supreme
Court decisions in Bailey and Reynolds, 151 most Southerners
“acquiesced in or approved of” peonage, either because they did
not perceive it to be morally or ethically wrong or because it was
“shrouded in overtones of legality and made respectable by the
approval of community rules.” 152 In this way, “public support for
the practice made [criminal] investigations difficult and [peonage]
convictions rare.” 153
With
the
complicity
of
law
enforcement,
court
administrators, and all-white juries, the South effectively
nullified anti-peonage legislation and appellate case decisions,
148. Langston Hughes, Justice, in THE NEW MASSES 15 (1931). See also
ROBERT SHULMAN, THE POWER OF POLITICAL ART: THE 1930S LITERARY LEFT
RECONSIDERED 248–50 (2000) (explaining that in the 1923 version of the poem,
Hughes had written, “ . . . we black are wise . . .” and discussing the possible
reasons for the textual change from “black” to “poor” in the later versions).
149. DANIEL, supra note 121, at 25.
150. See id. at 25–26 (describing how “much peonage stemmed from custom,
not law” and giving examples of blacks settling purported contract debts with
“no aid from a court” as they became peons—additionally, “court-approved
contract with prisoners proved even more vicious” in perpetuating the custom of
peonage).
151. See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court
and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
646, 708 (1982) (calling Bailey and Reynolds “landmarks in the slow process of
exorcising the vestiges of slavery from American law”).
152. DANIEL, supra note 121, at 23.
153. Id.

1624

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1595 (2015)

replacing them with local custom. 154 Law enforcement officials
arrested blacks for manufactured crimes, such as vagrancy or
engaging in loud talk with white women, and held them in local
jails; judges, mayors, and justices of the peace working for—or
getting kickbacks from—the business owners who benefitted from
the labor entered sentences comprised of fees and costs; laborers
then made informal settlements with the business owners to pay
their debts, real or imagined, in exchange for their release; and so
on. 155 These “cases” rarely made it into a courtroom, and when
they did, attorneys almost never represented blacks, and court
dockets and other record-keeping was poor, if not nonexistent. 156
As a result, the eight Southern states, where more than
seventy-five percent of the black population lived, had their
coffers filled with the bounty extracted from former slaves and
their descendants via the peonage system. 157
While the informal agreements between planters and
workers negotiated through the bars of a local jail cell were
clearly exploitative, the formal contracts—the breach of which
was litigated in court—could be even more punitive. 158 Ed Rivers,
for instance, of United States v. Reynolds, 159 ultimately served a
year on a chain gang for the act of simple breach of contract but
would have served only two months in jail if he had opted for that
154. See id. at 25 (describing the norm of corrupt practices among local law
enforcement, the similarities between Southern legislation and the Black Codes,
the lack of court advisement in the settlement of purported contract debts, and
other state and local law regimes that “favored employers”).
155. See Mae C. Quinn, In Loco Juvenile Justice: Minors in Munis Cash
from Kids, and Adolescent Pro Se Advocacy Ferguson and Beyond, BYU L. REV.
(forthcoming Dec. 2015) (discussing that many justices of the peace received jobs
“as a result of political patronage or by offering special treatment to influential
community members,” and were “paid from fines and fees they were able to
collect from litigants, raising questions about their objectivity”).
156. BLACKMON, supra note 73, at 7–8 (discussing the reconfiguration of the
South’s court system at the turn of the twentieth century that allowed
landowners to coerce African Americans into labor contracts).
157. See id. (describing the prevalence of labor contracts that former slaves
were forced to accept).
158. See DANIEL, supra note 121, at 26 (explaining the punitive nature of
formal sharecropping contract construction, as well as general court sympathy
for that system).
159. See supra notes 133–142 and accompanying text (describing the facts
and holding of United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914)).
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penalty when he had first pled guilty in court to larceny. 160
Federal employees assigned to investigate allegations of peonage
often displayed an “apathy or acquiescence” regarding the
system, and Southern juries were notorious for having no
sympathy for blacks alleging that they were entrapped by
peonage. 161 One Justice Department official in Florida explained
his failure to sustain a conviction in a peonage case resulted from
the fact that “no white jury will convict a white man for anything
he might do to a Negro.” 162
In the decades to follow, despite the migration of thousands
of blacks to the North, the growth of the industrial economy
during World War I, and the introduction of the mechanization of
agriculture, patterns of exploitation continued among Southern
laborers. 163 In the 1920s, many planters still considered blacks to
be no more than private property. 164 Complaints filed with the
NAACP and the Department of Justice confirm that black
laborers were not only subjected to peonage but to acts of physical
brutality by white employers in an attempt to coerce them to
continue working. 165 By 1945, sources suggest that although
peonage had diminished, reports of abuses continued—many of
them from outside the South. 166 A Senate Subcommittee heard
testimony in 1951 that peonage had “yet to be obliterated” in
160. See DANIEL, supra note 121, at 27 (“Had Rivers chosen jail when he had
first pled guilty to petit larceny, he would have served only about two months.”).
161. See id. at 32–33 (explaining the dismissal of a case in which the
attorney successfully argued for dismissal because the witnesses were
“principally negroes,” and detailing the notoriety of Southern juries’ prejudice
against the enforcement of peonage laws through the report of U.S. Attorney
William Armbrecht).
162. Id. at 33.
163. See id. at 132 (discussing the continued exploitation of blacks in the
1900s).
164. See id. (“[F]ederal apathy, local customs, and community acquiescence
allowed peonage to exist almost unhindered in the 1920s as it had a generation
earlier.”).
165. See id. (discussing that the efforts of the NAACP, U.S. field attorneys,
and victims in reporting abuses could not dislodge peonage from its roots in
Southern local customs).
166. See id. at 186 (“Since 1945, these sources present a picture . . . which
suggests that peonage certainly diminished; but to what degree it persisted is
impossible to determine. Reports of such abuses continued, and many of the
reports came from outside the State.”).
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Georgia. 167 The 1961 Commission on Civil Rights reported that
the Department of Justice had received sixty-seven complaints of
peonage or slavery between 1958 and 1960. 168 In 1969, there was
evidence that peonage persisted among groups of foreign workers
who had emigrated from Central and South America to Southern
farms and turpentine camps. 169 As the historian Pete Daniel has
written: “Like the Mississippi River floods, the incidence of
peonage rose and fell, unpredictable, violent, inexorable.” 170
Such was the judicial system’s abandonment of African
Americans. Unfortunately, there are disturbing parallels to the
legal system of today: we still incarcerate people for debt, and
those people are disproportionately people of color.
III. The New Peonage
There are typically two types of debt that lead to court action
and the risk of incarceration. The first is private debt resulting
from unpaid credit card balances, medical bills, car payments,
and payday loans and other high-interest, short-term cash
advances relied upon by low-income people; this type of debt can
result in the creditor or a debt collector suing the debtor in civil
court. 171 If the debtor does not appear or the court decides that
the failure to pay is “willful,” the court can issue an arrest
warrant for criminal contempt and incarcerate the defendant
until she posts bond or pays the debt in full. 172
167. Id.
168. Id. at 188.
169. See id. at 190 (“[A] 1969 federal anti-poverty pamphlet . . . noted that
‘semi-feudal conditions’ existed in the turpentine camps of the South. Advances
were given and were difficult to pay off, so tenants moved off . . . because they
were instructed to remain on the farms until they had paid their debts.”).
170. Id. at 149.
171. See O. Randolph Bragg & Daniel Edelman, Fair Debt Collection: The
Need for Private Enforcement, 7 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 89, 90–93 (1994–1995)
(explaining the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, private debt, and the actions
that debt collectors can take to recover the debt).
172. See Cammett, supra note 60, at 403 (explaining how failure to pay
private debt can lead to incarceration in some circumstances, such as defying a
court order or failing to show up in court). See also Lea Shepard, Creditors’
Contempt, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1509, 1527 (2011)
Any effective debt collection technique relies on coercion: the ability of a
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The second type of debt is legal financial obligations (LFOs),
which court systems impose upon criminal defendants in three
categories: fines or monetary penalties as a condition of the
sentence to punish for the commission of the criminal offense
itself; restitution to compensate victims for their calculable
losses; and user fees to raise revenue for the state. 173 Included
within the last group are fees that can be assessed at virtually
every stage of the case, beginning with the application fee for a
public defender and including some or all of the following: a jail
per diem fee for pretrial incarceration; a fine “surcharge”;
administrative fees and costs; prosecution reimbursement fees;
investigation fees; jail fees for the post-trial or post-plea
sentence; 174 probation or parole fees; 175 drug testing fees; vehicle
interlock device fees for driving under the influence convictions;
fees for mandatory drug, alcohol or mental health treatment; and,
of course, interest fees, which can be compounded, on all unpaid
legal debts. 176 User fees are increasingly administered by private
probation companies that pass on the cost of their services to the
offender; the failure to make these payments can result in
incarceration that is served in addition to any jail or prison
sentence imposed for the offense itself. 177
creditor to make credible threats to extract payment from
debtors. . . . Courts presiding over in personam actions compel debtors to
show up in court and provide information about their assets or to turn
over money or property to creditors by threatening to deprive debtors of
their liberty.
173. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 4, 7–10 (describing the three
categories of LFOs).
174. Such costs are billed to inmates in forty-one states. Joseph Shapiro, As
Court Fees Rise, the Poor are Paying the Price, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED
(May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasingcourt-fees-punish-the-poor (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
175. These are billed to inmates in forty-four states. Id.; see also Paul
Peterson, Supervision Fees: State Policies and Practice, 76 FED. PROBATION 40,
40 (2012) (noting that in 1997 at least forty states charged supervision fees,
which is part of a trend that has increased).
176. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 4, 7–10 (displaying a set of
graphics that shows which fees may apply at various stages in a State’s judicial
process).
177. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: AMERICA’S
“OFFENDER-FUNDED” PROBATION INDUSTRY 1–6 (2014) (finding that over 1,000
courts across the U.S. inflict patterns of abusive collection tactics and financial
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The profile of the typical criminal defendant in terms of
socioeconomic status, race, and educational attainment, is very
different from that of the average U.S citizen. When a middle or
upper income person receives a court fee or fine, most can readily
pay it, ending their contact with the system; in contrast,
empirical data confirms the following regarding the majority of
defendants: they are overwhelmingly poor, with most qualifying
for indigent defense; large percentages do not have a high school
diploma; they function at the lowest literacy levels; and they are
disproportionately people of color. 178 Given this reality, for the
typical criminal defendant or young person in delinquency court,
a single court-imposed fee or fine can trigger a chain reaction that
leads inexorably to a whole host of potentially disastrous
complications, including, but not limited to, incarceration. 179
This Part proceeds in five sections. First, it sets out the
relevant case law governing criminal-justice debt since the
Supreme Court decisions in Bailey and Reynolds; then it fleshes
out the impact of LFOs on juveniles, families, and the state;
finally, it concludes with a discussion of the ways in which the
peonage system of the post-Civil War era parallels the new
peonage of today.
A. Constitutional Protections and Limitations
Although the U.S. Congress abolished debtors’ prisons under
federal law in the 1830s, 180 with twelve states following suit
hardship using an “offender-funded” model of privatized probation).
178. See ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 38, at 10 (detailing a Ninth
Circuit finding that “African-Americans and Latinos in [Washington] were
disproportionately arrested for drug possession and delivery, far more likely to
be searched, and less likely to be released than their white counterparts. These
same disparities extend to the assessment of LFOs . . . .”).
179. See Rebecca Vallas & Roopal Patel, Sentenced to a Life of Criminal
Debt: A Barrier to Reentry and Climbing Out of Poverty, 46 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
J. POVERTY & POL’Y 131, 131 (2012) (emphasizing the damage that can result
from criminal-justice debt).
180. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws in the
United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 16 (1995) (explaining that the
practice of imprisoning people for debt was abolished at the federal level in
1833). But see 25 Cong. ch. 35, Feb. 28, 1839, 5 Stat. 321 (1839) (providing in
1839 that federal courts would follow the laws abolishing imprisonment for debt

THE NEW PEONAGE

1629

between 1821 and 1849 and the majority of states discontinuing
the practice by the 1870s, 181 the practice has persisted to the
present, as state constitutional and statutory bans on
imprisonment for debt typically exempt crime from their scope. 182
Therefore, jail time is not prohibited for such noncommercial
debts as those stemming from criminal court involvement and
those stemming from failure to pay child support or alimony, 183
and it is not prohibited for contractual debts stemming from civil
contempt orders. 184 Not surprisingly, these developments have
coincided with the rise of mass incarceration. During the 1970s
and 1980s, there was a dramatic increase in the number of state
statutes allowing for incarceration as a penalty for debt, 185 and in
within the states in which they sat).
181. See Tabb, supra note 180, at 16 (noting that many states abolished the
practice of imprisoning people for debt during the 1830s and 1840s). For a
history of debtors’ prisons in the U.S., see generally PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS
AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA (1974); BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS (2009);
DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION (2001); CHARLES WARRANT, BANKRUPTCY IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935). See also MARGOT C. FINN, THE CHARACTER OF
CREDIT 109–96 (2003) (providing a history of imprisonment for debt in Europe).
182. See Cammett, supra note 60, at 382–84 (asserting that “States run
afoul of the spirit, if not the constitutional requirements, of Bearden [which
abolished debtor’s prisons] in a variety of ways” including conditional criminal
justice debt and programs that allow the reduction of debt through served jail
time).
183. See Richard E. James, Putting Fear Back into the Law and Debtors
Back into Prison: Reforming the Debtors’ Prison System, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 143,
165–67 (2002) (describing current examples of state court practices that
represent a “de facto debtor’s prison system” that keeps noncommercial debtors
accountable to courts and avoids unconstitutionality). Incarceration is also
allowed for such noncommercial debts as those stemming from tort and from tax
and licensing fees. Id.
184. See, e.g., Press Release, Payday Businesses Unlawfully File 1500
Criminal Complaints Against Borrowers to Collect Money, TEX. APPLESEED (Dec.
17, 2014), https://www.texasappleseed.org/press-releases?field_featured_value
=All&field_status_value=All&field_multi_project_association_target_id_entityre
ference_filter=72&field_status_value_1_op=or&field_status_value_1=All&=Appl
y (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (condemning the practice of courts issuing civil
contempt orders on behalf of payday loan businesses in order to enforce
contractual debt, as it creates a de facto debtors’ prison regime) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
185. See BANNON ET AL. supra note 37, at 19 (detailing the evolution of
Supreme Court precedent holding that “debtor’s prison can be used to collect
criminal justice debt only when a person has the ability to make payments but
refuses to do so”); see also Arthur J. Goldberg, Equality and Governmental
Action, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 205, 221 (1964) (“The ‘choice’ of paying $100 fine or
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the late 1980s and early 1990s, state and county rules
increasingly allowed for jail time for failure to pay monies owed
to private creditors as well as court fines and fees. 186 With the
fiscal crisis of the 2000s, states faced growing budget deficits, and
court systems—municipal, county, and state level—were under
pressure to be fiscally self-supporting. 187 Using the threat of
incarceration to pressure low-income people to pay off their debts
has become a common strategy of the criminal justice system. 188
Since 1970, the U.S. Supreme Court has relied upon the
Fourteenth Amendment in three cases to affirm the
unconstitutionality of incarcerating those too poor to pay their
debts. 189 In Williams v. Illinois, 190 the appellant, Willie E.
Williams, was convicted of petty theft and received the maximum
sentence of one-year incarceration in addition to a $500 fine and
$5 in court costs. 191 An Illinois statute provided that a defendant
could be forced to remain confined in order to “work off” his
monetary obligations at a rate of $5 per day at the conclusion of
his sentence. 192 Because Williams could not pay the monies owed,
spending thirty days in jail is really no choice at all to the person who cannot
raise $100. The resulting imprisonment is no more or no less than imprisonment
for being poor . . . .”); Derek A. Westen, Comment, Fines, Imprisonment, and the
Poor: “Thirty Dollars or Thirty Days,” 57 CAL. L. REV. 778, 806–07 (1969)
(discussing imprisonment-for-debt provisions of laws).
186. See MO. REV. STAT. § 543.70 (1979) (allowing a judge to imprison
someone for not paying their fines); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.826 (1985)
(allowing incarceration if someone does not comply with the judge’s order—
including payment of fines); Cammett, supra note 60, at 403 (explaining that
failure to pay private debt can result in incarceration); see also DOUGLAS N.
EVANS, THE DEBT PENALTY: EXPOSING THE FINANCIAL BARRIERS TO OFFENDER
REINTEGRATION, 2–10 (2014), http://justicefellowship.org/sites/defaultfiles/The
%20Debt%20Penalty_John%20Jay_August%202014.pdf
(describing
state
statutes allowing incarceration for debt and the court’s dependency on these
fees).
187. See ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 38, at 8–9 (remarking on courts’
increased reliance on LFOs for funding, specifically in Michigan, New Orleans,
and Ohio).
188. See id. (noting the increased use of incarceration as a punishment for
those unable to pay their debts).
189. See infra notes 190–196 (summarizing relevant case law).
190. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
191. Id. at 236.
192. See id. at 236 n.3 (describing the criminal code section authorizing
payment of fines through imprisonment at a rate of $5 a day).
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the state determined that he would be confined for 101 days
beyond the maximum period of confinement for the offense. 193
The Court held that imprisoning an individual for involuntary
nonpayment of a fine or court cost violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when the aggregate
imprisonment exceeds the statutory maximum imprisonment
term for the crime. 194 Therefore, “once the state has defined the
outer limits of incarceration necessary to satisfy its penological
interests and policies, it may not then subject a certain class of
convicted defendants to a period of incarceration beyond the
statutory maximum solely by reason of their indigency.” 195
One year later, Tate v. Short 196 involved Preston A. Tate of
Houston, Texas, who was committed to a municipal prison farm
for eighty-five days to satisfy his accumulated fines of $425
resulting from traffic offenses. 197 The Court extended its
reasoning in Williams to defendants not facing jail time for the
original offense but who are unable to pay fines, ruling that the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from automatically
converting a fine into a jail term when the defendant is indigent
and cannot pay the fine in full. 198
The third in the trio is Bearden v. Georgia, 199 involving
Danny Bearden, an illiterate man with a ninth grade education
who pled guilty to felony burglary and theft and was placed on
three years probation. 200 As a condition of probation, he was
ordered to pay a $500 fine and $250 in restitution. 201 Although
Bearden borrowed money from his parents in order to pay the
first two installments of his debt, totaling $200, he was laid off
from his job a month later and was unable to pay the remaining
193. See id. at 236–37 (“[H]e could not pay the fine and costs of $505.”).
194. Id. at 240–41.
195. Id. at 241–42.
196. 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
197. Id. at 396–97.
198. See id. at 397–98 (“[P]etitioner’s imprisonment for nonpayment
constitutes precisely the same unconstitutional discrimination since, like
Williams, petitioner was subjected to imprisonment solely because of his
indigency.”).
199. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
200. Id. at 662.
201. Id.
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balance. 202 Six months later, the state filed a petition to revoke
his probation because he still had not paid. 203 After an
evidentiary hearing, the court revoked the probation, entered a
conviction, and sentenced him to serve the remaining portion of
the probationary period in prison: 204
[T]he [sentencing] court curtly rejected counsel’s suggestion
that the time for making the payments be extended, saying
that “the fallacy in that argument” is that the petitioner has
long known he had to pay the $550 and yet did not comply
with the court’s prior order to pay. The sentencing judge
declared that “I don’t know any way to enforce the prior orders
of the Court but one way,” which was to sentence him to
imprisonment. 205

The Georgia Court of Appeals rejected Bearden’s claim that
imprisonment for failure to pay a fine violated the Equal
Protection Clause, and the Georgia Supreme Court denied
review. 206
Consistent with Williams and Tate, but relying instead on
the concept of fundamental fairness required under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 207 the Court
characterized the sentencing court’s treatment of Bearden as
unconstitutionally depriving him of his freedom:
The focus of the [sentencing] court’s concern, then, was that
the petitioner had disobeyed a prior court order to pay the fine,
and for that reason must be imprisoned. But this is no more
than imprisoning a person solely because he lacks funds to pay
the fine, a practice we condemned in Williams and Tate. By
sentencing petitioner to imprisonment simply because he could
not pay the fine, without considering the reasons for the
inability to pay or the propriety of reducing the fine or
202. See id. at 662–63 (“Petitioner, who has only a ninth-grade education
and cannot read, tried repeatedly to find other work but was unable to do so.”).
203. See id. at 663 n.3 (explaining that the trial court found that the
petitioner violated his parole for failure to report as directed and failure to pay
fine and restitution).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 674 (internal citations omitted).
206. See id. at 663 n.5 (citing the earlier Georgia Supreme Court cases
supporting decisions to reject claims and deny review).
207. See id. at 666 n.8 (explaining the advantages of a due process approach
when considering a defendant’s financial background or status in sentencing).
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extending the time for payments or making alternative orders,
the court automatically turned a fine into a prison sentence. 208

The Court determined that a sentencing court cannot revoke
probation for failure to pay a fine and make restitution absent
evidence and findings that the probationer was somehow
responsible for the failure, and that alternative forms of
punishment would be inadequate to meet the state’s interest in
punishment and deterrence. 209 It held that sentencing courts
must determine two things before imprisoning a defendant for
failure to pay court fees and restitution: ability to pay and
alternatives to imprisonment. 210 If the defendant willfully refused
to pay or make efforts to obtain the resources to pay, he may be
imprisoned for this failure. 211 However, even if the defendant is
indigent and cannot pay, he may still be imprisoned if there is no
alternative to imprisonment that would adequately satisfy the
state’s interests. 212
Aside from Fourteenth Amendment cases in which the fact
patterns and questions presented have directly mirrored those of
Williams, Tate, or Bearden, 213 subsequent case law has addressed
208. Id. at 674.
209. See id. at 672 (“Only if the sentencing court determines that
alternatives to imprisonment are not adequate in a particular situation to meet
the State’s interest in punishment and deterrence may the State imprison a
probationer who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay.”).
210. Id.
211. See id. (“If the probationer willfully refused to pay or failed to make
sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, the court may
revoke probation and sentence the defendant to imprisonment . . . .”).
212. See id. (“Only if alternative measures are not adequate to meet the
State’s interests . . . may the court imprison a probationer who has made
sufficient bona fide efforts to pay.”).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 986 F.2d 283, 284 (8th Cir. 1993)
(vacating the judgment revoking probation for non-willful inability to pay under
Bearden and remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with the
Eighth Circuit’s opinion); Cleveland v. City of Montgomery, No. 2:13CV732MHT, 2014 WL 6461900, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 17, 2014) (declaring that the
constitutional principles set out in Bearden apply in municipal court
proceedings); Johnson v. State, 707 S.E.2d 373, 374 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)
(reversing the revocation of defendant’s parole for failure to pay court-ordered
fines and fees because the trial court failed to either make a finding of the
defendant’s willfulness in failure to pay or consider other punishment
alternatives if the defendant was not at fault); Wills v. Commonwealth, 396
S.W.3d 319, 326 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013) (finding that the trial court abused its
discretion by revoking probation without considering alternatives to
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other issues arising from questions regarding the legality of
imprisonment for criminal-justice debt. 214 For instance, there
have been cases—typically in the context of probation revocations
for failure to pay court costs—that have established that the
defendant must have the opportunity to present evidence of
indigence at a hearing, that the hearing must determine whether
the failure to pay was willful, and that there must be written
findings of fact regarding ability to pay. 215 Courts have also
consistently held that the defendant must be given a reasonable
opportunity to discharge the fine, and that alternatives to
imprisonment must be considered by the sentencing court when
the failure to pay was not willful, including installment plans and
reductions of fee amounts. 216 There has been conflicting case law
among the lower courts, however, as to whether the defendant or
the state bears the burden of proving indigence and
willfulness. 217 There is also a conflict among the courts as to
whether plea bargains in which the state agrees to—or a statute
imprisonment when the defendant failed to pay the weekly restitution fee in full
despite good faith efforts to make payments).
214. See infra notes 216–221 and accompanying text (summarizing case
law).
215. See, e.g., Jordan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Ark. 1997) (requiring
written findings of fact regarding ability to pay); Greene v. Dist. Ct. of Polk Cty.,
342 N.W.2d 818–21 (Iowa 1983) (requiring a hearing to determine responsibility
for failure to pay prior to commitment and finding that jailing defendant
without notice or an opportunity to explain why he had not satisfied the
conditional order was a denial of due process); Hendrix v. Lark, 482 S.W.2d 427,
431 (Mo. 1972) (remanding indigent defendant to city court for a hearing to
determine her ability to pay the fines and costs, and if unable to pay
immediately, ordering an opportunity for her to pay in reasonable installments
based upon her ability to pay).
216. See, e.g., Gilbert v. State, 669 P.2d 699, 703 (Nev. 1983) (“[B]efore a
defendant may be imprisoned for nonpayment of a fine, a hearing must be held
to determine his financial condition, and an indigent defendant must be allowed
reduction of fine or discharge of fine through installment payments.”); State v.
Townsend, 536 A.2d 782, 786 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (finding that
defendant’s willful failure to pay restitution obviated the need for sentencing
court to consider alternatives).
217. Compare State v. Bower, 823 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)
(requiring the defendant to “show cause” why he should not be punished for
failure to pay fines), with Del Valle v. State, 80 So. 3d 999, 1013 (Fla. 2011)
(holding that the state must provide sufficient evidence of ability to pay and
willful refusal to pay, after which the burden shifts to the probationer to prove
inability to pay to rebut the state’s evidence).
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mandates—automatic dismissal of the charges upon the payment
of court costs should be subject to constitutional protection. 218
In the years since Bearden, courts frequently have either
ignored these constitutional protections or developed strategies to
skirt their edges. For instance, researchers have found that
courts in many states are “either unwilling or unable to waive
fees based on indigence, to tailor payment obligations to a
person’s ability to pay, or to offer meaningful alternatives to
payment such as community service.” 219 At least fourteen states
impose a “poverty penalty,” meaning that litigants are assessed
additional costs and penalties for being unable to pay off LFOs
immediately. 220 Similarly, many states have at least one
mandatory sentencing fee that cannot be waived regardless of the
defendant’s ability to pay, and payment plans are often based not
on an individual’s actual ability to pay, but on the state’s
standard collection policies. 221
Another strategy, utilized by several states, including
California and Missouri, is “fines or time” alternative sentencing
that allows defendants to “volunteer” to be jailed in lieu of
payment. 222 Under this scenario, judges view nonpayment as an
implicit request to automatically convert fines to jail time,
without engaging in a colloquy with the defendant regarding
218. Compare Moody v. State, 716 So. 2d 562, 565 (Miss. 1998) (holding that
a felony statute for writing bad checks that requires an automatic payment of
$500 plus restitution in exchange for dismissal violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it is “discriminating to the poor, in
that only the poor will face jail time”), with People v. Memminger, 469 N.Y.S.2d
323, 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (finding that defendants’ inability to accept plea
offer because of indigency did not violate their equal protection or due process
rights). “All of these rules apply to the unequal treatment of indigent defendants
after conviction and sentencing. They restrict the state’s power to increase the
stringency of sentences already imposed on convicted indigent defendants. They
do not restrict the District Attorney’s authority.” Id.
219. BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 13. But see State v. Blazina, 344 P.3d
680, 685 (Wash. 2015) (holding that a sentencing judge must make “an
individualized inquiry into the defendant’s current and future ability to pay
before the court imposes LFOs”).
220. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 13 (criticizing the use of poverty
penalties).
221. See id. at 13–14 (highlighting the inequality in payment plan
minimums and schedules that ignore an individual’s ability to pay).
222. See id. at 23 (describing debt repayment or forgiveness through
incarceration in Missouri, California, and North Carolina).
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ability to pay. 223 A variant of the “poverty penalty” is to place
those who are unable to immediately pay off their LFOs on
supervised probation with a thirty or sixty-day suspended
sentence, regardless of ability to pay; when they are found to
have willfully violated probation by not keeping up with
payments, they are automatically sentenced to part or even the
full length of the suspended sentence. 224 Although the Supreme
Court barred this practice in Tate v. Short, 225 which federal
appellate courts have followed, 226 it continues to persist in state
and municipal courtrooms across the United States. 227
In addition to challenging the new peonage premised upon
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses, litigants have a potential avenue for redress in the
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. 228 The existing
doctrine on excessive fines, however, specifies that the term
“fines” is restricted to payments made to a sovereign as
punishment for wrongdoing, 229 and that the interpretation of
“excessive” is limited to gross disproportionality to the offense,
with no examination of the personal impact of a fine on the
defendant. 230 Yet, Beth Colgan argues that the historical record
supports a broader interpretation than the Supreme Court allows
with its conclusion that economic sanctions for people who are
223. See id. (noting a Missouri public defender’s successful challenge to a
judge’s practice of converting unpaid LFOs into jail time).
224. See ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 38, at 22–23 (describing the
process of “fine or time” sentences in municipal courts).
225. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 399 (1971) (prohibiting the state from
converting a fine into a prison term for an indigent defendant without means to
pay).
226. See, e.g., Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F.2d 726, 729 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding
that courts may not impose a sentence that requires a defendant to choose
between paying a fine “forthwith” or incarceration).
227. See ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 38 at 23–24 (reporting on the
frequency of “fine or time” sentences in Orleans Parish municipal court).
228. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
229. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265
n.6 (1989) (finding supportive similarity among definitions of “fine” in
Eighteenth and Nineteenth century legal dictionaries).
230. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998) (explaining
the rationale of a gross proportionality standard between the gravity of the
offense and the forfeiture).
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unable to pay their debts is outside the scope of the Clause
regardless of how excessive the debts may be. 231 Colgan provides
a detailed analysis of colonial and early American statutory and
court records regarding fines to argue that the Court’s limitations
on the use of historical evidence should be challenged. 232 She then
proposes a reinterpretation of the Clause that considers a “fine”
as a deprivation of anything of economic value in response to a
public offense, regardless of the recipient; and that “excessive”
requires individualized consideration of offense and offender
characteristics as well as the effect of the fine on the specific
defendant or litigant. 233 Colgan’s proposed interpretation could
gain favor among judges and legislators if they agree that it is
“more faithful to the historical record, while allowing for
consideration of contemporary practices and understandings,” 234
thus providing greater individual protection to the millions of
American adults and children who struggle with LFOs.
Lastly, and not surprisingly given this Article’s grounding in
the post-Civil War concept of peonage, there is potential for the
Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on involuntary servitude to be
explicitly applied to situations arising out of criminal justice

231. See Colgan, supra note 60, at 283 (suggesting that if history is
constitutionally relevant to interpretation, the Supreme Court has relied on an
incomplete and skewed historical record); see also LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN,
CHARGING INMATES PERPETUATES MASS INCARCERATION 6 (2015) (“Litigation
centered on the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause offers a unique
opportunity to argue that charging inmates fees while incarcerated is
unconstitutional.”); Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the
Original Meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833,
893-94 (2013) (arguing that a narrow conceptualization of the excessive fines
clause under the Eighth Amendment is not compelled by Supreme Court
jurisprudence, and that the “Anglo-American legal tradition” calls for
consideration not only of the proportionality between offense and penalty
amount but also the defendant’s ability to pay).
232. See Colgan, supra note 60, at 295–336 (providing historical evidence to
refute the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “excessive” and “fines”).
233. See id. at 343 (“[Historical evidence detailed in this article weighs
heavily in favor of the notion that a ‘fine’—regardless of recipient—is a
deprivation of anything of economic value in response to a public offense.”); id.
at 347 (suggesting that historical evidence supports a broad scope of factors in
determining proportionality and an explicit bar against fines that would
impoverish the defendant).
234. Id. at 337.
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debt. 235 The Thirteenth Amendment is a “grand yet simple
declaration of the personal freedom of all the human race within
the jurisdiction of this government.” 236 As Akhil Amar and Daniel
Widawsky argue in the context of contemporary cases of child
abuse, the Amendment is “more than a mere nineteenth-century
relic, written only to reform a ‘peculiar’ time and place,” 237 but
instead “was designed to challenge longstanding institutions and
practices that violated its core values of personhood and
dignity.” 238
Admittedly, the text of the Thirteenth Amendment creates
an exception for the punishment for crimes “whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted.” 239 Yet, many people with LFOs
find themselves entrapped in the criminal justice system because
they lack the tools—such as a lawyer, transportation, or
employment—necessary to successfully navigate it. 240 When
these individuals are convicted of a crime or adjudicated
delinquent of a juvenile offense, it could be argued that they have
not, in fact, been “duly convicted,” as “duly” is defined as
“correctly, fairly, legitimately, as required, or rightfully.” 241 They
have also not been “duly” sentenced when such punishment
includes financial obligations that these individuals have no
viable means to meet. Instead, they have been convicted and
sentenced in violation of the “more universal, transcendent norm”
announced by the Thirteenth Amendment: that slavery in all its
forms shall not exist. 242
235. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.”); cf. Gross, supra note 60, at 181–84 (arguing that the bankruptcy
laws implicate the Thirteenth Amendment through the peonage laws).
236. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69 (1873).
237. Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A
Thirteenth Amendment Response to Deshaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1359
(1992).
238. Id. at 1374.
239. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
240. See supra notes 171–175 and accompanying text (describing the current
criminal justice system’s use of LFOs and the system’s disparate impact upon
the poor).
241. See WILLIAM C. BURTON, BURTON’S LEGAL THESAURUS 202 (Brian Burton,
ed., 4th ed. 2007) (listing synonyms for “duly”).
242. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 237, at 1359 (contending that the
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An obvious objection to the invocation of the Thirteenth
Amendment in this context is that it is too great a conceptual
leap to compare the condition of involuntary servitude that the
Amendment condemns with the situation confronted by criminaljustice debtors of today. Yet, as Vern Countryman, Karen Gross
and others have argued in the context of bankruptcy, 243 unless
one is a strict constructionist, the fact that the framers had no
conception of modern-day criminal-justice debt “does not
eliminate conceptual parallels.” 244 Nor does it rule out
contemporary situations in which the Thirteenth Amendment,
Anti-Peonage Act, or analogous state laws can be implicated,
such as the circumstances faced by David Ramirez. 245 In fact, as
Gross has pointed out, 246 there has been a growing movement to
Thirteenth Amendment should be interpreted broadly).
243. See Countryman, supra note 60, at 826–27 (arguing that involuntary
Chapter 13 bankruptcy for individual debtors that includes a payment plan
taken from future earnings violates the Thirteenth Amendment); Gross, supra
note 60, at 177 (calling attention to the potential for situations under federal
bankruptcy laws to implicate or violate the Thirteenth Amendment); Margaret
Howard, Bankruptcy Bondage, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 191, 192–93 (arguing that
involuntary repayment plans in the Bankruptcy Code’s 2005 amendments
implicate the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude);
Robert J. Keach, Dead Man Filing Redux: Is the New Individual Chapter Eleven
Unconstitutional?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 483, 502 (2005) (arguing that the
Bankruptcy Code’s 2005 amendments “by paralleling chapter 13 but not
prohibiting involuntary cases or forced conversions, and by not providing the
option of escape through dismissal or conversion . . . raise genuine Thirteenth
Amendment concerns”). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Issues
Posed in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 571, 579 (2005) (arguing that, although not a frivolous
argument, a challenge to chapter 11 based on peonage is likely ultimately to fail
because “there is no possibility of contempt or imprisonment for those who fail
to make the required payments . . . [resulting] only in denial of the discharge
and dismissal of the case”). See also S. Elizabeth Gibson, Constitutional Issues
Raised by BAPCPA, NAT’L BANKR. CONF. 12–15 (June 1, 2007),
http://www.national bankruptcyconference.org/pubs.cfm.
244. Gross, supra note 60, at 177.
245. See supra notes 20–32 and accompanying text (describing the
experience of David Ramirez).
246. Gross, supra note 60, at 177 n.80 (“There has been a growing movement
to apply the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment and [A]nti-[P]eonage laws to a variety of
situations (e.g., abortion and surrogate motherhood) that could not have been
within the contemplation of the framers.” (citing application of the Thirteenth
Amendment to abortion, surrogacy, institutionalized labor of the mentally
handicapped, religious totalism, education, and migrant labor)).
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apply the Thirteenth Amendment and anti-peonage laws to a
variety of situations that could not have been within the
contemplation of the framers. 247 The Supreme Court itself has
addressed the applicability of the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban
on involuntary servitude to white, mentally-impaired farm
laborers, whose circumstances admittedly differ from those
existing in 1865, but who arguably share similarities with those
entrapped by the two-tiered system of justice that exists in
today’s U.S. courtrooms. 248 Thus, if nineteenth century peonage is
characterized by statutes that require, at a minimum, an
individual to work against her will as the result of indebtedness,
and if the coercion is made manifest by a threat of physical harm
or imprisonment, there are undeniable similarities between the
old and new forms of peonage. 249 In sum, constitutional
protections against the imprisonment of those too poor to pay
their debts are not limited to interpretations of the Fourteenth
Amendment 250 but may also be found in the Eighth as well as the
Thirteenth Amendments.

247. See, e.g., Amar and Widawsky, supra note 237, at 1359–60 (arguing
that child abuse implicates the core concerns of the Thirteenth Amendment, and
that the Amendment “provides the best constitutional vehicle to conceptualize
and characterize” such cases); Paul R. Friedman, The Mentally Handicapped
Citizen and Institutional Labor, 87 HARV. L. REV. 567, 579–82 (1974) (arguing
that under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Thirteenth Amendment,
mentally handicapped residents of public and private institutions who perform
work for those institutions must be compensated); Robert L. Misner & John H.
Clough, Arrestees as Informants—A Thirteenth Amendment Analysis, 29 STAN.
L. REV. 713 731–34 (1977) (arguing that using arrestees as informants violates
the Thirteenth Amendment, as the relationship and imbalance of power
amounts to involuntary servitude); Lorraine Stone, Neoslavery—“Surrogate”
Motherhood Contracts v. The Thirteenth Amendment, 6 L. & INEQUALITY 63, 73
(1988) (declaring that surrogate motherhood contracts represent “baby-selling”,
a form of “person-selling” that violates the Thirteenth Amendment).
248. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944 (1988) (“The
guarantee of freedom from involuntary servitude has never been interpreted
specifically to prohibit compulsion of labor by other means, such as psychological
coercion. We draw no conclusions from this historical survey about the potential
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment.”).
249. See infra Part III.E (describing parallels between peonage and
criminal-justice debt).
250. See supra notes 184–207 and accompanying text (outlining case law
using the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the indigent from imprisonment).
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B. The Cost of Juvenile Court Involvement
On November 24, 2004, a century after Marcus published his
chronicle of life in a Georgia “peon camp,” 251 a thirteen-year-old
named Taylor M. and several other boys in Ventura County,
California, threw rocks at construction equipment owned by J&S
Excavating (J&S). 252 After one of the boys threw a firecracker
into a bulldozer, Taylor shut its door, and the bulldozer ignited. 253
Damages were estimated at over $170,000, including repair costs,
rental expenses, and lost labor, 254 although the estimate failed to
account for the amount that J&S ultimately recovered from its
insurance company. 255 The state charged Taylor with arson and
felony vandalism in juvenile delinquency court, following which
he admitted the allegations, and the judge declared a maximum
confinement period of three years, eight months. 256 At this time,
Taylor was struggling both academically and behaviorally in the
sixth grade, having failed several courses and been repeatedly
disciplined for misbehavior. 257 In addition, he was diagnosed with
a learning disability and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder, and his peers ridiculed him for attending special
education classes. 258
On April 25, 2006, upon the prosecutor’s recommendation,
the court placed Taylor in a deferred entry of judgment (DEJ)
program with multiple conditions, including monthly restitution
payments of $100. 259 Soon thereafter, Taylor’s parents, who
251. See supra notes 3–20 and accompanying text (recounting aspects of
Marcus’s experiences in a peon camp).
252. In re Taylor M., Juv. No. B215562, 2010 WL 557271, at *1 (Cal. Ct.
App. Feb. 18, 2010).
253. Id.
254. See id. (“J&S suffered $171,235.55 in damages, including repair costs,
rental expenses, and lost labor.”).
255. Email from David Andreasen, Appellate Attorney for Taylor M., to
author (July 24, 2015, 19:41 EST) (recalling that the company did not ultimately
bear the claimed losses) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
256. See Taylor M., 2010 WL 557271, at *1 (charging defendant with arson
and vandalism in excess of $400, in violation of CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 451(d),
594(b)(1)).
257. Brief for Appellant at 12–13, In re Taylor M., Juv. No. B215562, 2010
WL 557271 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2010).
258. Id.
259. See In re Taylor M., Juv. No. B215562, 2010 WL 557271, at *1 (Feb. 18,
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struggled to pay their bills, experienced a series of setbacks; his
mother battled cancer and suffered two strokes and his father
was disabled. 260 His parents separated, and his father became
homeless, as did his older brother. 261 Because of his mother’s
declining health, Taylor had to assist her with basic tasks of
cooking and cleaning, while at the same time he made numerous
attempts to find work to pay his restitution. 262 Despite these
hurdles, Taylor’s grades improved as did his school attendance
and behavior, and he managed to complete all eighty hours of
court-ordered community service as well as a counseling
program. 263 Ultimately, however, Taylor’s family was able to pay
only $175 toward restitution between 2006 and 2009, at which
time Ventura County Probation Officer Monica Gomez
recommended revocation of his DEJ placement because “no effort
[was] being made . . . at all.” 264 The court agreed and revoked
Taylor’s DEJ placement, putting him on formal probation that
left him vulnerable to the three years, eight months, term of
incarceration. 265 In 2010, the Court of Appeal of California
affirmed the judge’s decision, stating the following:
In January 2008, after hearing appellant’s explanation for his
failure to comply with the conditions of his DEJ placement, the
court provided him another opportunity to do so. It warned
him, however, that he must make more than the “terrible
effort” that he had made in the prior 18 months. Appellant
again failed to make payments on a regular basis, despite
2010) (“The court placed him in the DEJ program on April 25, 2006 pursuant to
section 790, under multiple conditions, including his making monthly
restitution payments of $100 toward a total restitution of $171,235.55, with a
right to credit for amounts paid by other parties.”); see also CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 791(b) (West 2015) (“[T]he court may summarily grant deferred entry of
judgment if the minor admits the charges in the petition and waives time for the
pronouncement of judgment.”).
260. Brief for Appellant at 13, Taylor M., 2010 WL 557271, at *8–9.
261. See id. (describing the significant decline in defendant’s family
circumstances).
262. See id. at 13–14 (“Appellant testified he applied for jobs at Pep Boys,
Islands Hamburger, Chili’s, Home Depot, Target, Newbury Park Bicycle Shop,
and many auto mechanics.”).
263. Id.
264. Taylor M., 2010 WL 557271, at *5.
265. In re Taylor M., Juv. No. B215562, 2010 WL 557271, at *1 (Feb. 18,
2010).
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having been told that [his DEJ placement would not be
revoked] if he could only make a small payment. The court
neither violated the constitution nor acted unfairly and
arbitrarily when it later revoked appellant’s DEJ placement
and placed him on probation. 266
Appellant argues that the court abused its discretion in
denying his request to reduce the amount of his monthly
restitution payment. We disagree. Moreover, the denial of that
request did not prejudice appellant. The probation department
would not have recommended the revocation of his DEJ
placement if he had met with his probation officer on a regular
basis and made small payments ($10, $5, or $1). Appellant
failed to establish that he tried to do those things. 267

The chain of events experienced by Taylor and his family is
typical of that encountered by many children in juvenile
delinquency court, whether the amount owed results from
restitution, fines, user fees, or a combination of the three
categories. For instance, in approximately twenty states,
legislatures have laws requiring the parent or legal guardian to
pay the costs of juvenile court fines and fees. 268 In some states,
parents have the right to negotiate these fees, but it is not an
easy process, and if they fail to pay, wages can be garnished, liens
can be placed on homes, and tax refunds can be automatically
applied to the court debt. 269 When a juvenile court judge orders a
child to be placed outside the home as part of the disposition,
twenty-two states have statutes that make it discretionary and
twenty-nine make it mandatory to require that the parent pay at
least part of these costs. 270 It may convincingly be argued that
266.
267.
268.

Id.
Id. at *4.
See Myles Bess, Double Charged: The True Co$t of Juvenile Justice,
YOUTH RADIO (May 8, 2014), https://youthradio.org/news/article/double-chargedfines-and-fees/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (quoting Lauren-Brooke Eisen, legal
scholar at New York University’s Brennan Center for Justice) (on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review). But see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2506 (4)
(capping restitution for delinquent juveniles at $500, calling for joint and
several liability for all participants, and enabling the court to waive restitution
“if the juvenile satisfies the court that the juvenile does not have, and could not
reasonably acquire, the means to make restitution”).
269. See id. (describing the potential consequences faced by parents in
California whose children fail to pay court fines and fees).
270. See Linda A. Syzmanski, Can Parents Ever be Obligated for the Support
of Their Institutionalized Delinquent Children?, 16 NAT’L CENT. JUV. JUST.
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particularly in the context of juvenile court, the assessment of
restitution is analytically distinct from the assessment of fines or
fees, because the concept of making the victim whole via the
payment of restitution is central to progressive notions of
restorative justice and to the juvenile court’s unique therapeutic
purpose. Yet, the consequences of failure to pay restitution for a
low-income family can be extreme and excessively punitive. For
instance, in thirty-six jurisdictions, statutes explicitly provide for
parent liability for restitution if the child is unable to pay or
unable to complete an alternative option, such as community
service. 271 In at least ten jurisdictions, if the child fails to pay
restitution fees or fine, it can result in a youth’s probation being
extended to age twenty-one. 272 Although the court must first
evaluate a family’s financial ability to pay LFOs, which usually
occurs at a hearing, judges have wide discretion in making such
determinations, and there is little oversight and very limited
opportunity to challenge the costs imposed. 273
In Alameda County, California, for example, the total
amount of juvenile court fines and fees imposed on children and
their families adds up quickly. Upon arrest, the cost of detention
in juvenile hall is $25 per day; if the youth is released from
detention, the cost of a GPS ankle monitor is $15 per day or $105
SNAPSHOT 4 (Apr. 2011) (allowing that even when payment is mandatory,
payment is based on a hearing’s determination of the parent’s ability to pay).
271. See Juvenile Restitution Statutes, NAT’L JUV. DEFENDER CENT. (Mar.
2015) http://njdc.info/juvenile-restitution-statutes (last visited Nov. 11, 2015)
(summarizing a national review of state restitution laws compiled by the
National Juvenile Defender Center and the University of Michigan Juvenile
Justice Clinic) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
272. See POLICY ADVOCACY CLINIC OF EAST BAY COMMUNITY LAW CENTER,
FINANCIAL COSTS FOR YOUTH AND THEIR FAMILIES IN THE ALAMEDA COUNTY
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: A GUIDE FOR ADVOCATES 3 (2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2448484
(describing
probation extension procedures in Alameda County, California); Jurisdictional
Boundaries, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION (Dec. 16, 2014),
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/qa04106.asp?qaDate=2013&text
(last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (displaying the extended age of juvenile court
jurisdiction for all states in 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
273. See Juvenile Restitution Statutes, supra note 265 (commenting on the
availability of alternative options to restitution subject to judicial discretion);
POLICY ADVOCACY CLINIC, supra note 272, at 6–7 (outlining the procedure for
juvenile fee reduction, waiver, and rehearing in Alameda County, California).
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per week. 274 For the process of determining whether a formal
complaint will issue, there is an investigation fee of $250. 275 If
there is an adjudicatory hearing, appointed counsel costs $300. 276
If the youth is found not delinquent, the charge may be
dismissed, but the family must still pay investigation and legal
fees. 277 If the youth is found delinquent, the judge will impose a
sentence and assign additional costs, such as a restitution order
paid to the victim and restitution fines paid to the California
State Restitution Fund ($25 dollars for a misdemeanor; $100 for a
felony). 278 If the youth is placed on probation, informal
supervision is $90 per month for an average of fourteen
months. 279 Formal probation is also $90 per month but can
include the following: regular drug testing at $12 per test; GPS
monitoring at $15 per day for an average of forty-five days; and
juvenile hall for $25 per day for an average of twenty-three days
for probation violations. 280 The family can request a financial
rehearing before a judge if the court’s financial hearing officer
denies a fee deduction or waiver request, but restitution orders
and fines can only be waived or reduced under very limited
circumstances. 281 If probation is successfully completed and the
youth is eighteen or older, the court may seal the juvenile court
record, but it will cost an additional $150. 282 In total, for children
who are detained for the average period, the bill could approach
or even exceed $2000. 283 In short, as in the earlier world of
274. Teresa Chin, The Co$t of Juvenile Court Involvement, YOUTH RADIO
(May 8, 2014), https://youthradio.org/news/article/double-charged/ (last visited
Nov. 11, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See id. (reporting the cost assessed in Alameda County courts even
when the case is ultimately dismissed).
278. POLICY ADVOCACY CLINIC, supra note 272, at 4.
279. Chin, supra note 274.
280. Id.
281. See id. (“After you complete probation and are at least 18, you may
apply to have your juvenile record sealed. $150."); POLICY ADVOCACY CLINIC,
supra note 266, at 6–7 (“Unfortunately, restitution amounts cannot be reduced
or eliminated based on the family’s inability to pay, unless the restitution has
been ordered for graffiti . . . .”).
282. Chin, supra note 274.
283. Bess, supra note 268.

1646

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1595 (2015)

peonage, the descent into the criminal justice system can impose
hidden but inexorable costs that may make extrication from the
system difficult if not impossible for lower income children and
families—even if a child is not ultimately adjudicated delinquent.
The municipal court systems of our states are another forum
that leaves children—typically older teenagers—struggling to pay
LFOs. Municipal courts are those that can promulgate local laws
relating to the community’s health and safety, such as traffic and
quality of life infractions, as long as they do not run contrary to
state law. 284 Mayors approve the laws, local police enforce them
via citation or arrest, and local judges adjudicate them in
municipal courtrooms. 285 A number of states preclude juvenile
court treatment for those who are older than fifteen or sixteen
and are alleged to have violated a state or municipal traffic
ordinance or regulation; instead, these matters are handled
exclusively by municipal courts. 286 Because these are considered
civil
proceedings, however, most
defendants—including
adolescents—are not represented by lawyers, and those who are
indigent do not receive appointed counsel. 287 As a result,
municipal court defendants fail to appreciate the consequences of
pleading guilty and are frequently left with significant user fees,
which can lead to incarceration for failure to pay, to appear in
court, or to comply with probation. 288 Numerous states, including
284. See Quinn, supra note 155 (remarking on the range of matters local and
municipal ordinances govern).
285. See id. (describing the predominant structure and politics of local
governments).
286. See Juvenile Justice System Structure & Process, OFF. JUV. JUST. &
DELINQ. PREVENTION (June 29, 2015), http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_
process/qa 04102.asp?qaDate=2014 (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (listing juvenile
court age limits across the jurisdictions in the United States) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
287. See Quinn, supra note 155 (recounting the juvenile and municipal court
procedure in Ferguson, Missouri, where court was once held for hundreds of
unrepresented defendants at a local basketball court); see also Lewis R. Katz,
Municipal Courts—Another Urban Ill, 20 CASE W. RE. L. REV. 87, 106–08 (1997)
(noting that in a study of 1,034 defendants in municipal court, 770 were without
an attorney and 264 were represented by an attorney, likely because the
unrepresented defendants did not have the resources to hire a lawyer).
288. See Quinn, supra note 155 (reasoning that without “meaningful
explanation of their options, advice about pleading guilty, or information
about . . . consequences” defendants are unlikely to comprehend that an
inability to pay fines can and will lead to arrest and jail time).
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Missouri, Wyoming, Texas, and Colorado, have municipal courts
that run what Elizabeth Angelone termed “shadow juvenile
justice systems” 289 that fail to provide specialized due process
protections for these young litigants. 290
In addition to the hardships resulting from economic
sanctions, the new peonage brings other, more intangible costs to
children and their families that go beyond the fees and fines that
are assessed against them.
C. Collateral Consequences for the Family
Kathie is a forty-nine-year-old white woman in Kitsap
County, Washington, who has four children, three of whom she
supports financially. 291 Although she is divorced, she lives in an
apartment with her ex-husband, his father, and three of their
children. 292 Kathie has eleven felony convictions for forgery,
stolen property, and possession of stolen property, which she says
resulted from a long-term drug addiction and living in poverty. 293
Her initial LFOs totaled $11,000, but with twelve percent
interest, she now owes $20,000. 294 Kathie is eighty percent deaf
and has limited employment opportunities, but she secured a job
at a prisoner re-entry program after participating as a client in
the program. 295 She earns $3,000 per month. 296

289. Elizabeth Angelone, The Texas Two-Step: The Criminalization of
Truancy Under the Texas “Failure to Attend” Statute, 13 ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON
MINORITY ISSUES, 433, 452 (2010) (coining the phrase “shadow juvenile justice
system”).
290. See Quinn, supra note 155 (“[M]issouri is not alone in . . . running
municipal courts without specialized protections or concerns for youthful
litigants. Several other states . . . fail[] to account for youthful vulnerabilities.”).
291. ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 38, at 70.
292. Id.
293. See id. (explaining how these convictions led to Kathie’s subsequent
crippling debt).
294. Id.
295. See id. (explaining Kathie’s mixed feelings about her job; while she is
grateful for the full time position, it is not enough to support her children
financially or to break out of debt).
296. See id. (detailing how Kathie now works for the same re-entry program
that she once took part in).
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As a result of Kathie’s failure to keep up with her LFO
payments, the court transferred her defaulted legal debt to a
collection agency, which would not negotiate a manageable
payment schedule with her. 297 Because of the constant financial
pressure, Kathie and her children have little choice but to
maintain a chaotic living situation: six people—including three
adults—renting a small three-bedroom apartment. 298 Her
criminal record and poor credit history have made it impossible to
find alternate housing. 299 Yet, the hardships for Kathie and her
children go beyond merely living under monetary constraints, as
she explained:
It seems like one of those challenges that are insurmountable.
It’s like a paraplegic trying to climb Mt. Everest. I mean it just
seems that impossible. It’s like an insurmountable barrier,
that seems like, I’m gonna die with this debt hanging over my
head. And I’m never gonna be able to have my own little piece
of property, my own little something. And it’s not even about
buying a house. I can’t even rent a place. 300

For many low-income people like Kathie, criminal-justice
debt and its resultant destabilization and stigma can pave a path
back to reoffending and, often, to prison. It makes probation and
parole violations more likely. 301 A suspended driver’s license
resulting from failure to pay one’s LFOs means loss of
transportation and the potential loss of employment, and it can
also lead to criminal sanctions if the person is caught driving. 302
Damaged credit means difficulty finding employment and
297. See id. (describing the credit company’s unrealistic approach to
payment schedule negotiation).
298. See id. at 71 (explaining that among those six adults, Kathie is forced to
uncomfortably reside with her ex-husband and father-in-law as a result of her
not being able to afford alternative housing).
299. See id. (detailing how Kathie’s former criminal convictions sent her into
immediate debt, from which she has not been able to recover).
300. Id. at 71–72.
301. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 20–22 (finding that all fifteen of
the states examined make criminal justice debt a condition of probation, parole,
or other correctional supervision, and when individuals fail to pay, they may
face re-arrest and incarceration); Shapiro, supra note 174 (finding that in at
least forty-four states, offenders can be billed for their own probation and parole
supervision).
302. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 24–25 (finding that the suspension
of driver’s licenses is a common practice that leads to a cycle of re-incarceration).
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housing, which makes it harder to meet other financial
obligations, resulting in a greater likelihood of recidivism. 303
Failure to provide one’s children with basic necessities can trigger
the intervention of Child Protective Services, which can lead to
neglect allegations and further court hearings and fees. 304 For
non-custodial parents like David Ramirez, failure to pay child
support can lead to incarceration, during which the debt
continues to accrue. 305 Further compounding a family’s
vulnerability, people who violate probation or parole are
ineligible for federal benefits such as Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program benefits (food stamps), low-income housing assistance,
and Supplemental Security Income (disability). 306
In recent decades, social scientists have increasingly studied
the impact on children of parental involvement with the criminal
justice system. 307 Not surprisingly, there are strong correlations
between such involvement and economic strain as well as family
instability. 308 Controlling for risk factors that were present prior
to incarceration (i.e., parental substance abuse, mental illness,
and lack of education), researchers have found that children
whose parents have been incarcerated (or placed under house
arrest) are eighty percent more likely to live in households with
303. See id. at 5 (explaining how the accumulation of debt during
incarceration and after court costs leads to more debt).
304. See Bullock, supra note 41, at 1043–44 (detailing Child Protective
Services’ tendency to confuse poverty for neglect); DiFonzo, supra note 41, at
92–96 (describing the role and powers of the court in a child neglect case).
305. See NAGRECHA ET AL., supra note 32, at 15 (describing aspects of court
ordered child support that make it a serious source of indebtedness for
incarcerated men).
306. See Barbara Weiner, Alleged Probation Violations Lead to Automatic
EMPIRE
JUST.
CTR.
(Nov.
2,
2009),
Termination
of
Benefits,
http://www.empirejustice.org/issue-areas/disability-benefits/non-disability-issues/
fleeing-felons/alleged-probation-violations.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2015)
(explaining how parole violations can lead to the termination of benefits) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF), MONT. DEPT. PUB. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
http://dphhs.mt.gov/hcsd/TANF.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (explaining
eligibility for TANF) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
307. See, e.g., Susan D. Phillips et al., Disentangling the Risks: Parent
Criminal Justice Involvement and Children’s Exposure to Family Risks, 5 CRIM.
& PUB. POL’Y 677 (2006).
308. Id. at 685.
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economic strain and 130 percent more likely to experience family
instability than those without incarcerated parents. 309
Furthermore, incarceration and other outcomes of arrest were
linked to increased likelihood of children developing serious
emotional and behavioral problems as well as alcohol and
substance abuse and, in turn, of becoming involved with the
juvenile or criminal court systems themselves. 310
Moreover, material deprivation experienced by low-income
parents, with or without criminal justice involvement, has also
been demonstrated to have both short- and long-term detrimental
effects on children. 311 These include aggression, anxiety, and
depression, as well as negative academic outcomes, poor health
statuses, and diminished future earnings. 312 In short, the
intergenerational effects of criminal justice involvement and
parental incarceration are exacerbated by LFOs that result from
juvenile and criminal court fees, fines, and other costs.
Yet, despite empirical evidence of family adversity resulting
from the new peonage, one of the ironies is that the cost to the
state of collecting court fees and of incarcerating those who have
failed to pay typically results in a net deficit for government
coffers, as discussed in the next section.
309. Id. at 688, 690.
310. See id. at 693 (linking “at-risk” youth to families where parents have
been arrested or incarcerated). See generally PEGGY GIORDANO, LEGACIES OF
CRIMES: A FOLLOW-UP OF THE CHILDREN OF HIGHLY DELINQUENT GIRLS AND BOYS
(2010) (explaining the dynamics of intergenerational transmission of crime,
violence, and drug use among the children of “highly delinquency” boys and girls
using quantitative and qualitative data).
311. See, e.g., Afshin Zilanawala & Natasha V. Pilkauskas, Low-Income
Mothers’ Material Hardship and Children’s Socio-emotional Wellbeing 22–24
(Fragile Families, Working Paper 2011) (explaining the results of a study that
found a strong link between children’s socio-emotional outcome and material
hardship); see also Wesley T. Church et al., Neighborhood, Poverty, and
Delinquency: An Examination of Differential Association and Social Control
Theory, 34 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REV. 1035, 1040 (2012) (finding a correlation
between family stability, poverty, and availability of resources and negative
behavior in children); Ofira Schwartz-Soicher et al., The Effect of Paternal
Incarceration on Material Hardship, 85 SOC. SERV. REV. 447, 448 (2011) (finding
that families suffer increased financial costs as a result of incarceration,
including transportation for visits to the facility, collect phone calls from the
inmate, and legal representation).
312. Zilanawala & Pilkauskas, supra note 311, at 3–4 (documenting the
negative effects low-income houses often have on children).
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D. Fiscal Impact on the State
In 1986, the Conference of State Court Administrators
(“COSCA”) adopted a set of standards related to the use of court
fines and fees in response to states’ growing reliance upon courts
to generate revenue to fund themselves as well as other functions
of state government. 313 In 2011–2012, COSCA revisited the topic
with a restatement of the earlier standards, which it labeled as
“principles.” 314 In the more recent iteration, the authors—who
themselves are retired state court administrators—acknowledged
the continuing pressure on courts to generate revenue, yet they
also condemned using court fines and fees to fund other state
services; warned that such use is nothing less than a regressive
tax imposed upon offenders and litigants; and called for fees to be
waived for the indigent. 315 The policy paper states:
In criminal cases, court leaders have a responsibility not only
to ensure that judicial orders are enforced—i.e., fees and fines
are collected—but also to ensure that the system does not
impose unreasonable financial obligations assessed to fund
other governmental services. In traffic infractions, whether
characterized as criminal or civil, court leaders face the
greatest challenge in ensuring that fines, fees, and surcharges
are not simply an alternate form of taxation. 316

COSCA invoked the Supreme Court’s 1971 decision in Boddie v.
Connecticut317 to assert the basic precept that access to the courts
is a fundamental right, 318 and it cited with approval several state
court decisions holding that filing fees in civil cases should be
313. See CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMIN’RS, STANDARDS RELATING TO
COURT COSTS: FEES, MISCELLANEOUS CHARGES AND SURCHARGES AND A NATIONAL
SURVEY OF PRACTICE 1–13 (1986) (detailing the process of determining new
standards and laying out the new standards).
314. See Carl Reynolds & Jeff Hall, Courts Are Not Revenue Centers, CONF.
ST. CT. ADMIN. (2012), http://cosca.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/COSCA/
Policy%20Papers/CourtsAreNotRevenueCenters-Final.ashx (last visited Nov.
11, 2015) (using case law to define the relevant principles of court-generated
revenue) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
315. See id. at 1, 8 (examining the affect court fees have on the indigent).
316. Id. at 1.
317. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
318. See id. at 380–81 (explaining that due process prohibits denying divorce
or other similar legal proceedings to those who cannot afford to pay the court
fees and costs).
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imposed only to fund programs directly involving judicial
services. 319 In regard to criminal cases, COSCA reiterated that
these court costs should also bear a reasonable relationship to the
expense of prosecution, although it acknowledged that
determinations of whether court costs are valid in criminal cases
rely on state-specific holdings, and that there is no general
principle that defines their validity. 320
Several other recent policy reports and white papers have
confirmed that states are increasingly turning to court user fees
and surcharges both to underwrite criminal justice costs and also
to close general budgetary gaps. 321 Given the evidence, it could be
argued that this practice potentially undermines separation of
powers by mandating that courts act as fundraising entities for
non-judicial programs or agencies created by the legislature or
executives. Florida, for example, uses them to such an extent that
observers have referred to the court system as “cash register
justice.” 322 The Sunshine State has added more than twenty new
categories of LFOs since 1996 and eliminated most exemptions
319. See id. at 375–76 (asserting that the right to take a case to court is a
function of due process because “the judicial proceeding [is] the only effective
means of resolving the dispute . . . and denial of a defendant’s access to that
process raises grave problems for its legitimacy.”); Reynolds & Hall, supra note
308, at 2–3 (detailing the decisions of other jurisdictions where access to the
court was held to be a fundamental right); see, e.g., Safety Net for Abused
Persons v. Segura, 692 So. 2d 1038, 1044 (La. 1997) (holding that fees assessed
must be for services that bear a “logical connection to the judicial system”); Fent
v. State ex. rel. Dept. of Hum. Servs., 236 P.3d 61, 70 (Okla. 2010) (holding that
portions of court costs cannot be deposited into accounts to fund non-judicial
programs); LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 341 (Tex. 1986) (holding that
“filing fees that go to state general revenues . . . are unreasonable impositions
on the state constitutional right of access to the courts”). But see Crist v. Ervin,
No. SC10-1317, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 1858, at *4 (Fla. Nov. 4, 2010) (upholding
statutes directing portions of civil filing fees to a general revenue fund).
320. See Reynolds & Hall, supra note 308, at 5–7 (explaining how court costs
sought from a defendant in a criminal proceeding vary widely from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction).
321. See, e.g., BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 30–31 (discussing that the
overreliance on criminal justice fees undermines the proper roles of courts and
correctional agencies); PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 47, at 6 (“In some cases,
criminal fees are used to support general revenue funds or treasuries unrelated
to the administration of criminal law.”).
322. Rebekah Diller, The Hidden Costs of Florida’s Criminal Justice Fees,
(Mar.
23,
2010), http://www.brennan
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.,
center.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Justice/FloridaF&F.pdf.
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for those unable to pay. 323 Although the state uses monies
generated by court fees to subsidize its general revenue funds,
the Florida legislature has failed to consider both the cumulative
effect on its citizens who are required to pay and the data that
criminal-justice debt can lead to recidivism. 324 Furthermore, in
many cases these debts are uncollectible, with even employee
performance standards reflecting that only nine percent of fees
levied in felony cases can expect to be collected. 325
Yet, states rarely examine the fiscal and personnel costs
incurred by courts and municipalities to administer collection
mechanisms that fail to exempt the indigent. 326 Just as
nineteenth century state legislatures entered into an unholy
alliance with private employers or corporations by “leasing out”
their incarcerated inmates to raise state funds and creating
“crimes” like vagrancy to feed such a system, so too are early
twenty-first century state legislatures turning the enforcement of
minor criminal justice sanctions into a device to raise revenues,
with poor and minority offenders paying the price.
The failure to recognize that LFOs require an extensive
infrastructure to turn court and correctional officials into
collection agents is, in fact, one of the limitations of the COSCA
paper, 327 which is an analytic weakness shared by those who
support the continued imposition of court fees and fines upon lowincome offenders. It is critical to acknowledge that such a regime
requires the following to maintain its operations: court personnel
to administer payment plans, driver’s license sanctions, electronic
fund transfers, liens, and wage and bank account garnishment;
specialized collection courts to adjudicate payment plans; law
enforcement to issue and serve warrants for failure to pay or
appear in court; and, not infrequently, court personnel to
themselves act as tax collection agents. 328 As a result, rather than
323. See id. at 1 (explaining that Florida is one of two states, the other being
North Carolina, that does not exempt indigent defendants from court cost
charges).
324. See id. at 7 (discussing the constitutional concerns of sending convicted
criminals into debt on top of their convictions).
325. Id.
326. See id. at 9 (discussing inefficiencies of collection mechanisms).
327. Reynolds & Hall, supra note 314.
328. Diller, supra note 322, at 13–19 (emphasizing the expense of collecting

1654

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1595 (2015)

serve as a straightforward revenue source for the state, the
income generated from this hidden regressive tax often does not
exceed the operational costs necessary to facilitate collection. 329
In fact, a recent cost-benefit analysis of court fees in eleven states
revealed that the cost of funding sheriffs, local jails and prisons,
prosecutors and defense attorneys, and court personnel to
administer these twenty-first century debtors’ prisons actually
comes at a fiscal loss to the state. 330 Other studies have confirmed
these findings. 331 This dynamic burdens the court system and
interferes with the proper administration of justice, as it diverts
the resources of courts away from their essential functions, and,
“in its most extreme form, threaten[s] the impartiality of judges
and other court personnel with institutional, pecuniary
incentives.” 332 Moreover, the new peonage has the “paradoxical
result of engendering more incarceration because the poor are
unable to pay, and the monetary costs of such punitive jailing is
still ultimately borne by the state.” 333
The parallels between the new peonage and the nineteenth
century version, which was discussed in Part II, are addressed in
the next section.
criminal justice debt).
329. See, e.g., ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 38, at 9 (explaining the
inefficient nature of criminal-justice debt).
330. RACHEL L. MCLEAN & MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS
JUSTICE CENTER 7 (2007) (“An examination of court-ordered obligations in eleven
states found an average of $178 million per state in uncollected court costs,
fines, fees and restitution . . . . [Additionally,] administrators in one state report
that only twenty-three percent of fines are successfully collected, and no action
is taken on uncollected payments.”).
331. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 322, at 18–19, which analyzed the utility of
arresting persons for failure to appear in Leon County (Florida) Collections
Court and found that the cost of incarceration was over $45,000 for the county
and the cost to make 838 arrests plus the cost to execute this many warrants
over the course of one year totaled over $62,000. In contrast, the monies
generated from the payment of bonds or the original debt were at most $80,000,
with the net loss to the county likely to be even greater, as the figures do not
include costs of first appearance hearings in court for those who were arrested.
Id; see also ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 38, at 23 (quoting a judge who
said that the “fine or time” practices in the Orleans Parish municipal court may
cost the city more than it collects, as the typical case involved debts of only $100,
which were converted into costly thirty-day jail sentences).
332. BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 30.
333. Cammett, supra note 60, at 383 (emphasis added).
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E. Parallels Between Old and New
There are certain obvious parallels between the old and new
forms of peonage, several of which have been at least implicitly
illustrated in earlier sections of this Article. 334 Both systems
involve either indebtedness or minor crimes for which fines or
collateral fees are imposed. 335 Both are concerned with monetary
payments owed by vulnerable individuals to the state or to more
powerful private entities. 336 Both involve coercive techniques
used against the debtor. 337 There are also less obvious parallels,
as well as distinct differences, which will be examined here.
Both the “old” and the “new” forms of peonage 338 share
structural similarities. Under the old form, law enforcement
arrested emancipated blacks on trumped-up criminal charges,
such as vagrancy, and permitted an employer to pay the
convicted defendant’s fine in exchange for his labor. 339 For some,
like Marcus, the employer-mandated hard labor was the
equivalent of incarceration; 340 for others, the debt required
workers to sacrifice basic life necessities in order to repay the
advance to avoid incarceration. 341 The landowners’ motivation
was to meet the South’s need for cheap, reliable labor as well as
to intimidate and remind emancipated blacks of their continued

334. See, e.g., supra notes 252–290 and accompanying text (suggesting
parallels between peons and defendants who have LFOs).
335. See notes 252–290 and accompanying text (noting the similarity
between criminal-justice debt and debt owed to former plantation owners by
blacks after the Civil War).
336. See notes 252–290 and accompanying text (noting LFOs are paid to the
State while peons paid debt to former plantation owners).
337. See notes 252–290 and accompanying text (suggesting the threat of
incarceration for failure to pay LFOs is analogous to the cycle of debt peons
endured).
338. For clarity, in this section, the terms “old form” and “new form” will
serve as shorthand references to the post-Civil War form of peonage and the
twenty-first century form of peonage, respectively.
339. See infra Part II (discussing the strategic use of arrests to facilitate
cheap labor by emancipated slaves).
340. See supra notes 3–17 and accompanying text (noting that Marcus
worked in shackles while under the supervision of armed guards).
341. See infra Part II (discussing the cycle of coerced labor in the old
peonage).
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lack of social and political status. 342 Under the new form, lowincome people, many of whom are already living at the margins of
society, frequently incur criminal-justice debt as a result of
minor, nonviolent offenses that in many instances stem from the
criminalization of poverty. 343 Whatever the motivation of the
state within this new paradigm, the scenario is reminiscent—at
least in spirit—of the “welfare reform” initiatives of the 1990s in
which the government mandated that the poor work, or at least
demonstrate their willingness to work, in order to receive
government assistance. 344 When people inevitably failed to
comply with the bureaucratic requirements of the welfare reform
regime, the government removed them from public benefits rolls,
and those with criminal records (or merely with pending criminal
charges) automatically lost their subsidized housing, public
benefits, and food stamps, with no recourse or opportunity to
appeal. 345 This allowed for the federal and state governments to
redirect these funds to other government programs and
agencies. 346 As with the “welfare-to-work” programs of the 1980s
342. See supra notes 3–17 and accompanying text (emphasizing the harsh
conditions endured by black victims of coercive labor practices during the old
peonage).
343. See supra notes 167–189 and accompanying text (explaining the neverending cycle of criminal-justice debt).
344. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (PRWORA), Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (requiring public
assistance recipients to begin working within two years of receiving benefits)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607).
345. See Sharon Dietrich, et al., Work Reform: The Other Side of Welfare
Reform, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 54 (1998) (explaining how criminal records,
among other factors, can prevent a person from receiving welfare benefits); Joel
F. Handler, Welfare-to-Work: Reform or Rhetoric?, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 635, 647–
51 (1998) (explaining how technical mistakes and criminal records prevent a
number of people from receiving welfare benefits); see also Peter Edelman &
Barbara Ehrenreich, Opinion, Why Welfare Reform has Failed, WASH. POST
(Dec. 6, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/
12/04/AR2009120402604.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (arguing that welfare
reform was “based on reckless assumptions about the economy, as well as a
callous disregard for the realities of sustaining a family”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
346. See DAVID GREENBERG ET AL., WELFARE-TO-WORK BENEFITS AND COSTS:
A SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH 5-6 (2009) (detailing that welfare-to-work programs
reduced government expenditure on welfare programs); Handler, supra note
345, at 637–41 (explaining the various ways that the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 allows states to spend
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and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, 347 under the new peonage, those with
criminal justice debt are mandated to pay their LFOs, and if they
fall behind, they, too, are removed from public benefits rolls. 348 It
is not unusual for debtors like David Ramirez 349 to “sacrifice food,
clothing, utilities, sanitary home repairs, and other basic
necessities of life in order to scrape together money” to pay off
their LFOs in order to avoid imprisonment. 350 And similar to the
old peonage, the monies collected from LFOs go toward programs
unrelated to the judicial system, including the state’s general
revenue funds. 351
Under both the old and the new forms of peonage, the
criminal justice system itself is complicit in their continued
operation. Under the old, court personnel inconsistently
maintained dockets and trial records, and sentences were handed
down by “provincial judges, local mayors, and justices of the
peace—often men in the employ of the white business owners
who relied on the forced labor produced by the judgments.” 352
This enabled the coercive labor system to thrive despite antipeonage legislation and court decisions. 353 Under the new form,
court fees and fines are often assessed without consideration of
the individual’s ability to pay, even in violation of state laws and
court decisions. 354 Meanwhile, state employees, operating under
little or no supervision, hand down sentences with no incentive to
significantly less money on welfare).
347. See Handler, supra note 345, at 637–47 (describing the effects of
PRWORA’s implementation).
348. See ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 38, at 67–68 (explaining how
LFOs can result in difficulties re-entering society as a result of reduced income,
worsened credit, difficulty finding work and housing, and potential reincarceration).
349. See supra notes 20–27 and accompanying text (discussing Ramirez).
350. Class Action Complaint at 36, Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv00253, 2015 WL 3417420 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015).
351. See supra notes 30–37 and accompanying text (discussing how these
funds are collected and used).
352. BLACKMON, supra note 73, at 7; see also supra Part II.C (discussing the
role of the judicial system in the corrupted system of criminal-justice debt).
353. See supra notes 94–98 (discussing the mechanisms of coercive labor
that allowed for financial benefit).
354. See supra notes 253–290 and accompanying text (discussing the
methods by which courts impose crippling fines).
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maintain careful data or to engage in impact analysis of fees or
costs. 355
Both the old and the new forms of peonage perpetuate the
essence of involuntary servitude. Under the old, the state
conspired with planters and merchants to use convict leasing and
sharecropping to entrap former slaves in a cycle of coerced
labor. 356 Again, their apparent motivation was to support the
struggling agrarian economy and to maintain the racial caste
system. 357 Under the new peonage, the punishment and
incarceration of nonviolent offenders for criminal-justice debt,
including at the pretrial stage when they are unable to post bail,
has contributed to and sustained the prison industrial complex. 358
With millions of low-level offenders filling U.S. jails and prisons
due (both directly and indirectly) to unpaid LFOs, private
probation companies and the state and federal corrections
agencies to which they supply goods and services have all thrived
while the inmate population has expanded. 359 Likewise, private
corporations such as Honda, Microsoft, Starbucks, and Target
have increasingly relied on prison labor, as it is cheap and
virtually liability-free for the employer. 360 Even the privatization
355. See supra Part II.C and accompanying text (explaining how the courts
allowed and even encouraged allaying court fines in a racially motivated
manner).
356. See supra notes 13–19 and accompanying text (providing an example of
the coercive techniques used to keep former slaves in a never-ending cycle of
debt).
357. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text (discussing the financial
incentives for the entrapment of former slaves by debt).
358. See Michael Brickner & Shakyra Diaz, Prisons for Profits: Incarceration
for Sale, 38 HUM. RTS. 13, 13–14 (2011) (discussing the power of the private
prison lobby and arguing that the increase in incarceration rates may be
attributed to private prisons); Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
2015, at MM38 (reporting that hundreds of thousands of people are in pretrial
detention in the United States, many for non-violent misdemeanor cases,
because they cannot pay the bail that has been set).
359. See Brickner & Diaz, supra note 358 (discussing the status the modern
private prison industry); see also Complaint at 2, Reynolds v. Judicial Corr.
Servs. Inc., No. 2:15-cv-161-MHT-CSC (M.D. Ala. Mar. 12, 2015) (alleging that,
working together, the City of Clanton, the Clanton Municipal Court, and a
probation services company operate a racketeering enterprise that extorts court
fines, costs, and fees from impoverished individuals under threat of jail, in
violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and
other laws).
360. Heather Ann Thompson, Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking

THE NEW PEONAGE

1659

of youth confinement facilities is now widespread in the United
States, with almost half of them privately operated, creating a
built-in incentive for companies to increase the number of youth
confined and lengthen the terms of their incarceration. 361 In
short, everyone wins—except the impoverished person unable to
pay off her criminal justice debt.
In these ways, an economic caste system is sustained under
both the old and the new forms of peonage. Under the old system,
state and county governments, large corporations, entrepreneurs,
and provincial farmers ran forced labor camps that defeated
meaningful freedom. 362 Under the new peonage, the cycle of
criminal-justice debt consistently suppresses the aspirations of
those among the poor who fall into its remorseless system of fines
and penalties. 363 Disenfranchisement laws, both then and now,
remove felons from the voting rolls, creating “a caste-like system
aimed at keeping blacks out of office and away from the ballot
box.” 364
Finally, and perhaps most poignantly, the roles of race and
socioeconomic status must be examined. The historical record
confirms that peonage and the laws of the 1870s and 1880s were
“systematic efforts to reestablish white control over blacks on
every front.” 365 Although there was also a class struggle in the
South during this period, it was conducted separately by whites
and blacks, for “[o]n the matter of racial equality, whites, rich
Crisis, Decline, and Transformation in Postwar American History, 97 J. AM.
HIST. 703, 717, 722, 729 n.39 (2010) (“Prison labor was attractive to American
employers for more reasons than lower wages; they also did not have to deal
with sick days, unemployment insurance, or workman’s compensation claims,
and they had few liability worries when it came to toxins or accidents in prison
workplaces.”).
361. See NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE NETWORK, POLICY PLATFORM:
CONFINING YOUTH FOR PROFIT 2–3 (July 2015), http://www.njjn.org/uploads/
digital-library/Confining-Youth-for-Profit_Sept2015FIN.pdf (detailing the moral
and fiscal problems of imprisoning youth for profit).
362. See supra notes 97–100 (explaining both how the former slaves were
forced into labor via debt, and the financial benefits of the plantation owners
and farmers as a result).
363. See supra notes 261–290 (giving an example of how modern
incarceration leads to an impossible-to-escape accumulation of debt).
364. COHEN, supra note 92, at XV.
365. Id.
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and poor, usually possessed a common cultural outlook.” 366 It can
be argued that this dynamic contrasts with the new peonage, in
which court fees and fines serve to oppress low-income
individuals of all races and ethnicities. Yet, there is disturbing
evidence that implicit racial bias guides the imposition of fees by
judges and court administrators. Research confirms, for example,
that courts impose a disproportionate burden of LFOs on lowincome people of color. 367 For instance, a 2014 study of municipal
courts in St. Louis, Missouri, found that a disproportionate
percentage of those who are criminally prosecuted and assessed
court costs and user fees are African Americans living below the
poverty line. 368 The report concluded that “it becomes all too
clear that fines and fees are paid disproportionately by the
African-American community. In other words, these
municipalities’ method of financial survival—bringing in revenue
via fines and fees—comes primarily at the expense of black
citizens.” 369
In general, however, the suggestion that the impact of the
new peonage is as much class-based as it is race-based finds
support in the fact that disproportionately high percentages of
African Americans are serving terms of incarceration that are not
necessarily the direct result of an inability to pay court fees. 370 In
366. Id. at XIV.
367. See, e.g., BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 4, 7–10 (analyzing statistics
that show a correlation between race and fees imposed by the courts); JESSICA
EAGLIN & DANYELLE SOLOMON, REDUCING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN
JAILS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LOCAL PRACTICE 8 (2015) (“The collection of court
costs and other financial obligations from defendants disproportionately
burdens African Americans and Hispanics who cannot pay. Aggressive collection
practices result in onerous and compounding debt, and even jail stays, for many
defendants.”); BETTER TOGETHER, PUBLIC SAFETY–MUNICIPAL COURTS 2, 8 (Oct.
2014) (analyzing the data indicating that the St. Louis County, Missouri courts
operate as punitive revenue centers); see also ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, supra note
38, at 10 (explaining that racial disparity exists at all levels of the criminal
justice system).
368. See BETTER TOGETHER, supra note 367, at 8 (examining the collection
and spending of court cost fees in St. Louis, Missouri, and finding that although
the population of the county as a whole is 24% black with eleven percent living
below the poverty line, the population of the municipalities that generate one
third of the county’s general operating revenue is 62% black, with 22% living
below the poverty line).
369. Id. at 3.
370. See Fredrick C. Harris & Robert C. Lieberman, Racial Inequality After
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other words, the population impacted by the new peonage may
not be disproportionately composed of people of color, because
both adults and youths of color have already been
disproportionately stopped by police, arrested, charged, and
convicted of criminal offenses—both serious and low-level—which
have resulted in incarceration. 371 Yet, this same reasoning
suggests the inverse in regard to juvenile delinquency court, and
it helps explain why large percentages of low-income juveniles of
color are particularly vulnerable to criminal-justice debt: they are
more likely than white youth to be charged with minor offenses
that are merely the function of adolescence, rather than
signifying criminality. 372 In an era in which juvenile dispositions
have become occasions for imposing court fees, fines, and
restitution costs, rather than incarceration, 373 young people of
color bear the brunt of this burden. 374 More research is clearly
needed, however, as much of the data related to race,
socioeconomic status, and criminal justice debt is anecdotal or
produces results that are specific to the population studied and
are not generalizable. 375
Racism: How Institutions Hold Back African Americans, 94 FOREIGN AFF. 9, 11–
18 (2015) (explaining how implicit structural racism and biases lead to
disproportionately high arrest rates for African-Americans).
371. See EAGLIN & SOLOMON, supra note 367, at 8 (detailing racial
disparities in the criminal justice system).
372. See Tamar R. Birckhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 53, 71 (2012) (discussing the role of race-based criminalization in
indebtedness); see also U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., SUMMARY OF
FINDINGS: ST. LOUIS COUNTY FAMILY COURT 1–2 (July 31, 2015) (finding that the
St. Louis Family Court “administration of juvenile justice discriminates against
black children” in the areas of intake, pretrial detention, probation violations,
and custody after adjudication).
373. See CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, ET AL., JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 2011, 52
(July 2014) (explaining that in 2011 67% of juveniles age fifteen or younger who
were adjudicated delinquent were put on probation, as compared to 61% of
juveniles age sixteen or over).
374. See, e.g., Editorial, Children Caught in a Racist System, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 2015, at A18 (“In St. Louis County, officials examined 33,000 juvenile
court cases over a three-year period and found that the system regularly treats
black children more harshly than white children and routinely denies indigent
children—no matter their race—basic constitutional rights.”).
375. See, e.g., Ed Munoz & Stephen Sapp, Racial/Ethnic Misdemeanor
Sentencing Disparities: Additional Evidence for Contextual Discrimination, 1 J.
ETHNICITY IN CRIM. JUST. 27, 28 (2003) (finding, in a narrow study of
misdemeanor sentences in five Nebraska counties, that non-white defendants
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While not an exhaustive analysis, the foregoing discussion
sets the stage for advancing several proposals for reform of the
new peonage.
IV. Proposals for Reform
The proliferation of court fees, and the costs incurred by the
state to collect them, has prompted some judges, politicians, and
lawmakers to question whether the practice has gone too far. 376
With the increased attention of public policy advocates and think
tanks, 377 as well as the recent focus of the media, 378 proposals for
reform have been generated, and some states appear to have the
will to take action. For instance, New Jersey initiated an amnesty
program to encourage thousands of people who owe fines to
appear at court sessions of the Fugitive Safe Surrender Program
where judges reviewed files and ordered fee reductions. 379
Conducted during four days in November 2013, more than 4,500
people turned themselves in, and hundreds with unpaid court
fees and fines were able to gain significant reductions. 380 Safe
were sentenced to fines more than forty percent higher than those imposed on
white defendants for similar offenses).
376. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 97–102 (2015) (calling for, among other things, reform to the way
municipal courts charge and collect fees); LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
OF THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA, NOT JUST A FERGUSON PROBLEM: HOW TRAFFIC
COURTS DRIVE INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA (2015) (identifying the damage that
municipal court practices in San Francisco can do to the impoverished and
calling for change); Maura Dolan & Lee Romney, State Chief Justice Says
Unpaid Traffic Fines Should Get a Day in Court, L.A. TIMES (May 21, 2015, 7:45
AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-ca-chief-justice-unpaid-trafficfines-20150520-story.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (discussing how California
Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye is calling for change to the way that traffic
violation fines are handled) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
377. See generally BANNON ET AL., supra note 37; ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY,
supra note 38.
378. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, On Probation, Lives Can Run Far Off Track,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2015, at A1 (reporting on a woman living in Baltimore and
struggling with the impact of criminal-justice debt, which led to job loss and
more than a month in jail because she fell behind in her payments and could not
afford to bail herself out).
379. See Shapiro, supra note 175 (describing the negative consequences of
monetary fees imposed on indigent criminal defendants in multiple states).
380. Id.
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Surrender programs for people who owe fines and fees are being
developed in other parts of the United States, including
Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 381 In Colorado, after Denver County Court
judges voted to stop issuing arrest warrants for failure to pay
fines because of the expenses of tracking debtors down, court
time, and imprisonment, Governor John Hickenlooper signed a
law that prohibits judges from incarcerating people who cannot
afford to pay court costs. 382 The 2014 bill, which adopts the
Supreme Court holding in Bearden v. Georgia, 383 requires courts
to examine a person’s ability to pay and to recommend a solution
such as community service or a payment plan if the person
cannot pay; only if the individual willfully chooses not to pay will
she be held in contempt of court. 384 Colorado Republicans and
Democrats voted nearly unanimously for the bill, 385 and a similar
bill has been signed by the Governor of Illinois. 386 In 2015, the
381. See Marge Pitrof, Plans in Motion for Fugitive Safe Surrender Program
in Milwaukee, WUMR (July 15, 2015), http://wuwm.com/post/plans-motionfugitive-safe-surrender-program-milwaukee (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (quoting
an organizer of the event as saying, “There are people who have fines and
warrants that they think they will never be able to get out from under, so they
refuse to try to go get jobs”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
382. See Recent Legislation, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1312, 1313–15 (2015)
(describing the nature and impact of the new Colorado law); see also Leslie
Jorgensen, Legislature Revokes “Debtors’ Prison,” COLO. OBSERVER (Apr. 24,
2014), http://thecoloradoobserver.com/2014/04/legislature-revokes-go-to-jail-cardfor-people-too-poor-to-pay-fines/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (reporting on the
passage of the “Debtors’ Prison Bill,” which received unanimous, bipartisan
support in the Colorado House and Senate) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
383. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668–69 (1983) (prohibiting a
sentencing court from revoking a defendant’s probation for the failure to make
restitution, absent evidence and findings that he was responsible for the failure
or that alternative forms of punishment were inadequate to meet the State’s
interest in punishment and deterrence).
384. Recent Legislation, supra note 382, at 1315–16 (describing Colorado’s
“Debtors’ Prison Bill,” which mandates on-the-record hearings before a court
may revoke a defendant’s probation for the failure to pay criminal debts);
Jorgensen, supra note 382 (noting that Colorado’s “Debtors’ Prison Bill” does not
relieve solvent defendants from paying criminal debts).
385. Jorgensen, supra note 382.
386. See Bill Status of HB5434, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY (July 2012),
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=5434&GAID=11&DocTy
peID=HB&LegId=65695&SessionID=84&GA=97 (last visited Nov. 11, 2015)
(explaining the effect of the bill and its legislative history) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Georgia legislature passed a bill that allows courts to “waive,
modify, or convert” LFOs upon evidence of significant financial
hardship, inability to pay, or “any other extenuating factors
which prohibit payment or collection.” 387
This Part advances several legislative and public policy
reforms that are designed to end the phenomenon of the new
peonage.
A. Impact Analysis of Fees
In order to accurately determine whether the imposition of
fees increases revenue or lowers recidivism, states are
increasingly relying upon evidence-based approaches. 388 Advocacy
organizations have conducted their own studies, 389 and state
legislatures have formed committees 390 to study the fiscal and
social costs of imposing fees and fines. Such an approach
objectively demonstrates “whether a policy is fiscally sound, or
merely a hypothetical revenue source that will actually cost more
to implement than it generates in revenue.” 391
A data-driven approach is also more likely to receive
bipartisan support. For instance, in 2011, Governor Steve
Beshear of Kentucky signed a bipartisan bill into law, the Public
Safety and Offender Accountability Act, which relied upon
research-based strategies to “reduce recidivism, hold offenders
accountable and maximize the state’s limited financial
resources.” 392 The reforms included strengthening parole and
387. H.B. 310, 42-8-102(e)(2), 2015–16 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015), available at
http://www. legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20152016/153410.pdf.
388. See PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 47, at 11 (“Evidence-based practices
significantly lower the costs borne by the state, and benefit the people involved
in the system, making those practices a popular, bipartisan approach for
criminal justice reform.”).
389. See id. (providing a study that examines the impact of fees and fines).
390. See id. (providing examples of committees that examine fees and fines).
391. Id.
392. Pew Applauds Kentucky Leaders for Comprehensive Public Safety
Reforms, PEW CTR. ON THE STATES (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.prnewswire.
com/news-releases/pew-applauds-kentucky-leaders-for-comprehensive-publicsafety-reforms-117341178.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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probation programs to reduce recidivism and to control costs. 393
Although it was not focused on court fees, the task force
assembled to examine the data and develop a reform package
included judges, a former prosecutor, and a former public
defender, the composition of which can serve as a model for other
legislative efforts. 394
An example of impact analysis in the context of LFOs may be
found in the South Carolina Omnibus Crime Reduction and
Sentencing Reform Act, passed with bipartisan support in 2010
and drafted by a “multiple stakeholder group” that included
community organizations, law enforcement, and practitioners. 395
The Act requires ongoing oversight in the form of annual
reporting of all criminal-justice related expenditures, and it
established the Sentencing Reform Oversight Committee to
handle this reporting as well as the policy adjustments that
might follow. 396 In addition, the bill requires that fiscal impact
statements accompany any proposed changes to sentencing
provisions of criminal offenses. 397 It specifies that the legislative
committee examining the proposed legislation “shall not take
action . . . until [it] has received the fiscal impact statement.” 398 It
mandates that state agencies and political subdivisions cooperate
with the Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Office (RFAO) in preparing
these statements, and that the RFAO request information from
nongovernmental agencies and organizations to assist in
393. See id. (reporting that the reforms could result in gross savings of $422
million over ten years).
394. See id. (alluding to the benefits of consulting numerous stakeholders in
the Kentucky criminal justice system to forge a consensus on a series of
comprehensive public safety reforms).
395. See South Carolina Governor Reduces Disparity Between Crack, Powder
Cocaine, and Reforms Other Sentencing Policies, ASSOC. PRESS (June 3, 2010),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/detail/news.cfm?news_id=928 (last visited
Nov. 11, 2015) (reporting that the new law encompasses a package of criminal
justice reforms) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
396. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., DUE SOUTH: SOUTH CAROLINA: JUSTICE SYSTEM
OVERHAUL 1–2 (May 2011), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/
documents/due_south_-_south_carolina.pdf (describing that the Act “should
result in fewer individuals returning to prison and more people having
successful lives”).
397. See S.C. CODE § 2-7-74 (outlining the necessary components of fiscal
impact statements following criminal offense changes).
398. Id. § 2-7-74(D).
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preparing the fiscal impact statement. 399 A section of the Act
requires people convicted of drug law violations to pay a
“controlled substance offense assessment” that would be directed
to drug treatment courts and exempts those who are deemed to
be indigent. 400 Advocates, however, have noted that such fees are
“still a burden to people who are convicted of drug offenses who
are already facing challenges with being involved in the justice
system.” 401
In short, evidence-based data analysis is a cost-effective and
politically feasible method of revealing the negative fiscal impact
that most criminal justice fees have on states, as well as their
“anti-rehabilitative impact” on people. 402
B. Legislative Initiatives
There are a number of legislative proposals that have been
advanced by advocates and lawmakers to end the phenomenon of
the new peonage. 403 These include requirements that the court
create and enforce fee exemptions and petitions for waivers for
indigence; that court personnel clearly inform people of the
possibility of exemptions; and that the procedure for obtaining
them be well-defined and not overly-complex. 404 A comprehensive
exemption system includes an evaluation at the time of the
criminal complaint or indictment of the individual’s ability to pay,
before the court imposes any fees or fines. Likewise, there should
be statutory protections for those who may initially have had an
ability to pay but whose financial circumstances have changed.
399. Id. § 2-7-74(F), (H).
400. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 396, at 2 (noting that the
reallocation of funds from criminal debt obligations to community-based
treatment options that help people before they become involved in the criminal
justice system may bring about more positive changes).
401. Id.
402. See PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 47, at 11 (demonstrating that numerous
states are turning to evidence-based data analysis to determine the effects of
imposing fees in the criminal justice system).
403. See id. at 11–18 (describing the success of legislation introduced by
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Maryland, and Washington that is aimed at
reducing criminal justice debt).
404. See, e.g., id. at 14 (describing legislative proposals).
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For people who do not initially qualify for waivers or exemptions,
the court should develop personalized payment plans that allow
for weekly or monthly payments for those who cannot afford to
pay a lump-sum balance. Hawaii, Kansas, Connecticut, and Ohio
are among the states that instruct courts to grant full or partial
waivers for people who are unable to pay fees or fines. 405 For
instance, the Hawaii statute explicitly states in regard to
“compensation fees” assessed upon conviction and probation fees
assessed upon sentencing that “no fee shall be ordered when the
court determines that the defendant is unable to pay the fee.” 406
There also are legislative proposals to eliminate unnecessary
interest, late fees, and collateral consequences for defendants. 407
Such protections are necessary, as a number of states charge
interest or late fees for late or missing payments even if the
reasons for nonpayment are compelling, such as child support
obligations. 408 The amount charged for late fees can be
exorbitant, such as California’s $300 late fee. 409 Proposed
405. See H.R. 2668, 2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2010) (concerning
crimes, punishment and criminal procedure); 2010 Kan. Sess. Laws Ch. 136
(same); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-30(e) (2012) (requiring courts to waive the costs
of electronic monitoring if the court finds that the person subject to electronic
monitoring on probation is indigent and unable to pay); OHIO ADMIN. CODE
5120:1-1-02 (2015) (prohibiting the division of parole and community services
from imposing a supervision fee if the offender demonstrates that he or she is
indigent and unable to procure the fee); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-605 (2015)
(requiring that courts waive the imposition of a compensation fee upon
conviction if a defendant is unable to pay); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-641 (2015)
(prohibiting courts from imposing a fee on a criminal defendant during
sentencing unless the defendant is or will be able to pay the fine); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 706-648 (2015) (prohibiting courts from imposing a probation services fee
on a criminal defendant unless the defendant is or will be able to pay the fine).
406. HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-648(1)(b) (2012); § 706-605(6); cf. Melissa B.
Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An Alternative
Account of Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 539–42
(2006) (discussing the enactment of new laws to protect uninsured patients from
hospital overcharging and aggressive collection practices that lead to the
garnishment of wages, imposition of liens on homes, and freezing of bank
accounts).
407. See PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 47, at 17 (noting features of legislative
proposals).
408. See id. (describing conflicting obligations that may subject those with
outstanding criminal debts to additional fees).
409. See id. (criticizing California’s one-time late fee as well as policies
enforced by some Florida counties, which impose an additional ten to twenty
dollar fee every time a defendant makes a late payment).
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legislation would prohibit the assessment of such charges unless
the court first conducts an on-the-record inquiry to determine the
ability to pay. 410 Similarly, if the failure to pay is not willful, the
court would waive any accrued interest, surcharges, or related
criminal-justice debt, and suspend all required payments and
interest accrued between the filing of the petition for a hearing
and the court hearing on the petition. 411 The State of Washington,
for instance, has introduced legislation that waives LFO interest
accrual when people are incarcerated. 412 One related proposal is
to prohibit the suspension of driver’s licenses for failure to pay, as
this policy can lead to a lack of transportation and loss of
employment, which are particularly pernicious collateral
consequences of debt. 413
Proposals have also been put forward to end the practice of
extended probationary supervision for non-willful failure to
pay. 414 At least thirteen states have statutes that allow for this
counterproductive practice, creating a system in which people
who have satisfied all the other conditions of probation are forced
to remain on supervision merely as a consequence of debt. 415
Likewise, some states have prohibited the practice of
incarcerating people who have committed non-violent technical
violations of probation, such as failure to pay fees, fines, or
410. See id. (outlining the procedures necessary to determine an individual’s
ability to pay).
411. See id. at n.80 (noting that although proposed legislation in some states
could result in the waiver or abatement of criminal debt obligations, this may
not be an option in all jurisdictions).
412. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.090(2) (2015) (permitting the courts to
reduce or waive the interest on legal financial obligations levied as a result of a
criminal conviction); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.110(4) (2010) (describing the
process by which interest on judgments shall be calculated); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.52.020 (1989) (describing the process by which the maximum possible
interest rates for interest on judgments are set).
413. See PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 47, at 18 (arguing that employment is a
major part of the rehabilitative and reentry process, which is jeopardized when
and individual loses their ability to legally drive).
414. See id. at 20 (describing statutes, regulations, and policies in Ohio and
Virginia that prohibit the extension of probation or parole due to failure to pay
criminal justice debt).
415. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 25 (revealing that Alabama,
Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia all continue the practice of
extending a defendant’s probation for non-willful failure to pay).
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costs. 416 The report of a panel in Virginia that recommended such
a law stated that if those who owed fees and fines were freed from
probation,
[T]hen probation and parole officers would have more time and
resources to supervise more serious and higher-risk offenders.
In addition it would reduce the number of technical violators
brought back to court and returned to prison. 417

The argument that onerous debt collection policies and practices
place an avoidable resource strain on states and municipalities
may be one of the most politically persuasive to lawmakers
considering these proposals. 418
It is critical to keep in mind, however, that although
legislative responses to the new peonage are a promising
strategy, they raise unanswered questions. For instance,
language supplied by statute or developed through appellate
review must provide more precise definitions of terms such as
“indigence,” “undue hardship,” “a finding of financial ability to
pay,” and “sufficient bona fide efforts to pay” if these protections
are to be effective in dismantling the modern debtors’ prison. 419
Otherwise, courts and individual judges will continue to have
unfettered discretion to determine which defendants qualify for
relief and which do not. 420 Of course bills such as those developed
in Colorado are an improvement on the status quo, as they
require courts to make specific determinations related to
indigence on the record, 421 but such laws must be carefully
416. See, e.g., H.R. 2309, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2009); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-305 (West 2012) (requiring fines, costs, restitution for damages,
support or community services from probationer).
417. ALTERNATIVES FOR NON-VIOLENT OFFENDERS TASK FORCE, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2009), http://leg2.state.va.us/dls/h&sdocs.nsf/By+Year/RD
4302009/$file/RD430.pdf.
418. See PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 47, at 5–6 (arguing that debt collection
policies place significant fiscal costs and burdens on states).
419. See Recent Legislation, supra note 382 at 1316–19 (elaborating on the
importance of providing precise definitions and adequate guidance for courts
who are tasked with upholding legislative responses to debtors’ prisons).
420. See id. (noting that while Colorado requires on-the-record indigency
hearings before incarcerating debtors for failing to pay debts owed to the state,
the legislature’s failure to provide substantive guidance may prove problematic).
421. See supra notes 402–407 and accompanying text (describing aspects of
bills that are designed to combat the problems associated with criminal-justice
debt).
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drafted and monitored to ensure accountability and effective
enforcement.
C. Right to Counsel in Non-Payment Hearings
It is long-settled law that the Sixth Amendment requires
that counsel be appointed to indigent criminal defendants who
face the risk of the loss of liberty. 422 Most states hold that this
right, which derives from the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, also applies to civil proceedings. 423 Most
422. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (holding that the state
was not obligated to provide counsel when the conviction did not result in actual
imprisonment, despite the fact that imprisonment was a potential penalty);
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (finding that courts must
determine whether appointment of counsel is necessary at probation and parole
revocation hearings); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding
that a defendant may not be subject to imprisonment without the aid of counsel,
regardless of whether the offense was a misdemeanor or felony, and regardless
of whether the offense qualified for a jury trial); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36–37
(1967) (holding that juveniles have the right to counsel in delinquency
proceedings); Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964) (concluding that the
right to counsel attaches when a suspect is indicted); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 342–45 (1963) (establishing that an indigent defendant in a criminal
trial has a right to the assistance of counsel, and that it is a fundamental right
essential to a fair trial).
423. See Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State Statutes Providing for a Right to
Counsel in Civil Cases, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POV. L. & POL’Y 245, 252–70
(2006) (showing that most states appoint counsel for civil litigants in certain
circumstances); William L. Dick, The Right to Appointed Counsel for Indigent
Civil Litigants: The Demands of Due Process, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627, 627–
32 (1989) (applying the Fourteenth Amendment to the right to counsel in civil
proceedings); see also Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011)
(establishing that the Due Process Clause does not automatically require the
state to provide counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an indigent
noncustodial parent who is subject to a child support order, even if that
individual faces incarceration); Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,
26–27 (1981) (finding that there is a due process right to appointed counsel
when a litigant may lose his physical liberty if he does not prevail in the
litigation, and that a balancing test should be used to make this determination,
considering the private interests at stake, the risk that the procedures used will
lead to erroneous decisions, and the government’s interest); Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339–41 (1976) (concluding that the Due Process Clause
does not require a hearing prior to the termination of social security disability
benefits, based on the balancing private interests and the government’s
interest); see also Kathryn A. Sabbeth, The Prioritization of Criminal over Civil
Counsel and the Discounted Danger of Private Power, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 889,
906–16 (2015) (examining the relative importance assigned to civil and criminal
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states also agree with Supreme Court dicta in Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services that relying on the “civil” or
“criminal” label placed on a proceeding when determining
whether there is a right to counsel is not particularly helpful in
this subset of cases, as the possibility of incarceration is an
equally serious restraint on one’s liberty interests whether it
results from a civil or criminal matter. 424 State courts are split,
however, on how best to determine whether the right exists when
applied to a given set of facts, with some courts holding that a
balancing test should be used on a case-by-case basis, 425 and
others holding that the right to counsel should be presumptively
guaranteed in all matters that could potentially result in
incarceration. 426 Several states have even held that there is no
right to counsel in civil fee collection proceedings regardless of
whether the defendant could be incarcerated, invoking the
civil/criminal distinction to support their holdings, thereby
rejecting Lassiter. 427
counsel, including the fact that civil judgments result in far-reaching collateral
consequences, and arguing that the prioritization of criminal over civil counsel
reflects a mistaken view of lawyers’ primary role as a shield against government
power).
424. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24–25 (1981)
(emphasizing that, in determining whether due process requires the
appointment of counsel for an indigent litigant, a court must first focus on the
potential curtailment of the indigent’s personal liberty rather than on the “civil”
or “criminal” label placed on the proceeding); see also McBride v. McBride, 431
S.E.2d 14, 16–17 (N.C. 1993) (citing Lassiter for the same proposition).
425. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dept. of Human Servs. v. Rael, 642 P.2d 1099,
1104 (N.M. 1982) (concluding that a balancing test should be used to determine
whether an indigent parent should be appointed counsel in a child support
case); Duval v. Duval, 322 A.2d 1, 3–4 (N.H. 1974) (holding that a trial court
may, in its discretion, appoint counsel to assist an indigent defendant to present
his case in a complicated nonsupport contempt hearing in which the defendant
faces imprisonment).
426. See, e.g., State v. Stone, 268 P.3d 226, 235 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012)
(finding that whether a proceeding is civil or criminal, due process is implicated
whenever incarceration is a possibility, and the defendant should be appointed
counsel at public expense); McBride, 431 S.E.2d at 18 (concluding that due
process requires a presumption in favor of an indigent defendant’s right to
appointed counsel when a proceeding can result in incarceration).
427. See, e.g., Andrews v. Walton, 428 So. 2d 663, 666 (Fla. 1983) (finding
that a defendant held in contempt for failure to pay child support and sentenced
to thirty days in jail was not entitled to counsel because it is a civil contempt
proceeding); Meyer v. Meyer, 414 A.2d 236, 239 (Maine 1980) (finding that a
defendant in child support contempt case had no right to counsel because the
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An argument that is gaining traction is that there should
presumptively be a right to counsel for indigent litigants in
nonpayment hearings whenever those hearings can result in
incarceration or an extension of probation or parole. 428 In the
recent case of State v. Stone, 429 James Stone pleaded guilty in
2001 to unlawful possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine) and second degree theft, and the trial court
sentenced him to 105 days in jail and twelve months of
community custody with a fine of $2,860. 430 Two years later his
supervision was transferred from the Washington Department of
Corrections to the superior court clerk’s office, as he now owed
(adding the interest) $3,179. 431 Two months later, without being
told of the right to counsel, he signed an order agreeing to
minimum monthly payments of twenty-five dollars, and agreeing
that if he failed to pay, an arrest warrant would be issued. 432 For
the next twenty-nine months, Stone made the monthly payments,
but when he missed a payment and a court appearance, an arrest
warrant was issued, and he was sentenced to ten days in jail. 433
This was followed by a period when he once again made
payments. 434 This scenario continually repeated itself; yet for
three years the court did not inquire as to whether Stone wished
proceedings were civil and not criminal); Adkins v. Adkins, 248 S.E.2d 646, 646–
47 (Ga. 1978) (determining that appointed counsel is not required in a contempt
hearing for failure to pay child support, even when the defendant was
imprisoned, as it is a civil proceeding); In re Calhoun, 350 N.E.2d 665, 666–67
(Ohio 1976) (determining that there is no right to counsel in civil proceedings
that can result in incarceration). But see In re Miami County Grand Jury
Directive to Creager, 82 Ohio App. 3d 269, 272 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (concluding
that a balancing test should be used when determining whether there is a right
to counsel in a civil contempt hearing).
428. See PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 47, at 22 (illustrating the importance of
a defendant’s right to counsel at enforcement proceedings for payment
obligations arising from his or her criminal sentences).
429. 268 P.3d 226, 227 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
430. Id. at 228.
431. Id.
432. See id. (describing the fines and fees comprising Stone’s total criminal
debt obligation).
433. See id. at 228–29 (emphasizing that when the trial court asked Stone if
there was anything that he would like to say, Stone replied that “he had been
evicted from his home . . . and that he didn’t just blatantly want to blow off the
Court and not make his payments . . . .” (citation omitted)).
434. Id.
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to have counsel appointed. 435 After the court finally inquired of
him and counsel was appointed, a fact-finding hearing was held
one week later, which the appellate court described as follows:
Stone testified that he was homeless; that he was left handed
and limited to twenty-five percent use of that hand; that the
Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) paid his
medical bills; that his only source of income was monthly net
payments of $339 from a . . . program . . . due to [his] disability
with [his] shoulder; and that he spent this money on shelter,
cigarettes, and “a few other necessities” like food. He also
testified that it cost him approximately $100 to travel to
Jefferson County for court appearances. 436

At the hearing’s conclusion, the judge sentenced Stone to forty-five
days in jail, with no inquiry as to his income or ability to pay, and
without granting a deduction in his LFO debt for either of his two
previous periods of incarceration. 437 On review, the Court of
Appeals of Washington held that a person has an absolute right
to counsel at “ability-to-pay” hearings where incarceration may
result, and that Stone’s due process rights were violated when he
was incarcerated without findings regarding his ability to pay: 438
Stone’s lack of counsel during these proceedings created an
‘asymmetry of representation’ because a prosecuting attorney
represented the State in this adversarial proceeding. As the
United States Supreme Court has observed, “The average
defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect
himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his
life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by
experienced and learned counsel.” 439

435. See id. at 228–30 (noting that the record contained an acknowledgment
of defendant’s rights signed by Stone, but that the trial court never orally
advised Stone of a right to counsel and neglected to ask him whether he wished
to have an attorney appointed).
436. Id. at 230.
437. See id. (referencing comments made by the trial judge who determined
that Stone’s failure to contact the court, by phone or letter, amounted to a
willful failure to pay and appear).
438. See id. at 233–36 (determining that the County’s “policy or placing
convicted felons on a pay or appear calendar and requiring them to represent
themselves violates fundamental due process rights”).
439. Id. at 235 (citations omitted).
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The federal appellate court clearly recognized that if counsel
had represented James Stone at the first enforcement proceeding,
it would have made the difference between his maintaining and
losing his liberty down the road. Counsel is needed to gather and
present evidence regarding the defendant’s ability to pay, to
assist her in navigating the often-complex procedures for
requesting a reduction or waiver of fees, and to ensure that she
understands the ramifications of payment orders or
commitments. 440 As discussed above, it is likely that early
appointment of counsel will ultimately save the jurisdiction
monies spent in repeated attempts at collection, issuing and
serving arrest warrants, and the costs of incarceration. 441
Of course it is critical to keep in mind that when counsel is
appointed, at least forty-three states and the District of Columbia
can require defendants to contribute to its cost. 442 This fee is
often a significant component of the total debt burden imposed by
LFOs, and given the disproportionate representation of lowincome defendants and civil litigants struggling under the new
peonage, it rests squarely on the backs of those least able to
afford it. 443 In Florida and Ohio, individuals must pay defender
fees even if they are acquitted or the charges are dismissed. 444 In
states that offer hardship waivers of these fees by statute, some
fail to provide them in practice. 445 Additionally, defender fees

440. See PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 47, at 22 (emphasizing the importance
of counsel when courts assess fees or fines).
441. See supra Part III.D (explaining that the cost of collecting fines and fees
and incarcerating those who cannot pay often exceeds the revenue generated by
fines and fees).
442. See Shapiro, supra note 175 (citing a state-by-state survey conducted by
NPR on the number of states in which defendants can be billed for a public
defender).
443. See supra notes 322–326 and accompanying text (contending that
criminal justice debt is a regressive tax).
444. See FLA. STAT. § 27.52(1)(b) (2012) (requiring that an applicant pay a
fifty dollar application fee to the clerk for each application for court-appointed
counsel filed); OHIO REV. CODE § 120.36(A)(1) (2006) (requiring that an applicant
pay an “application fee to the clerk of court at the time the person files an
affidavit of indigency or a financial disclosure form with the court, a state public
defender . . . or any other counsel appointed by the court . . .”).
445. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 12 (finding that in Arizona, courts
order defendants to pay public defense costs in the majority of cases, and that
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often serve to discourage low-income people, including children in
juvenile court, from exercising their constitutional right to
counsel, resulting in systematic waivers of counsel. 446
Yet, if the right to counsel at nonpayment hearings is
implemented in combination with the legislative proposals
discussed above, 447 such as the exemption of attorney fees for
indigence, these costs should cease to be a significant hardship
for low-income defendants.
D. Increase Job Training and Placement
One last proposal that will lessen the harmful impact of
criminal-justice fees is to require that states focus on offender
rehabilitation through rigorous job training, treatment, and
placement programs, rather than by assessing fees or mandating
community service hours that interfere with training and
employment. Well-designed community service programs can, of
course, help those with criminal convictions to develop job skills

many courts utilize uniform fee structures that do not take into account the
ability to pay).
446. See Juvenile Justice Guide Book for Legislators, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES 4 (2011), www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/jjguidebook-complete.pdf
(finding that many states require administrative fees prior to submitting an
application to apply for court-appointed counsel in juvenile court, and that
“[s]ome consider these fees prohibitive to youths who have very little money”).
Of course, even when counsel is appointed and the attorney fees are not overly
burdensome, the quality of counsel can be substandard, particularly for
juveniles. See Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 771, 791–800 (2010) (discussing the nature and pervasiveness of
substandard legal representation in juvenile court, the negative effects of poor
lawyering on youth, and the structural causes and resistance to the
empowerment of youth); see also, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS
DIVISION, SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: ST. LOUIS COUNTY FAMILY COURT 1–2 (July 31,
2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-releases-findings-constitu
tional-violations-juvenile-delinquency-matters (last visited Nov. 11, 2015)
(finding that the St. Louis Family Court “fails to provide adequate
representation for children in delinquency proceedings, in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
447. See supra Part IV.B (discussing legislative proposals that would
mitigate criminal-justice debt).
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and to gain the training necessary to avoid reoffending. 448 For
those with mental illness or developmental disability, however,
their participation in such programs may not be possible.
Likewise, many states offer only limited community service
options in lieu of paying off debt. 449 For instance, in Florida, very
few judges agree to convert mandatory criminal debt imposed in
felony cases to community service. 450 In North Carolina, the law
prohibits this practice altogether. 451
For those who are able to participate, when community
service programs are well-structured and robust, the benefits can
be long-lasting. 452 One county in Pennsylvania offers work details
in lieu of criminal-justice debt payments at preauthorized, wellfunctioning sites, such as the Salvation Army or YMCA. 453 It also
provides a program for those incarcerated at the county prison to
work on county property, such as the local courthouse. 454 In this
way, people gain job skills while avoiding debt. As one public
defender reflected:
[T]he work program offers the person a chance to prove to
themselves, family and the court that they are serious about
reintegrating themselves as a productive, responsible member
of the community, building self-esteem and dignity along the
way . . . and of course the ultimate goal, reducing
recidivism. 455
448. See PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 47, at 23 (noting that, in the
alternative, “poor program design can stymie the potential rehabilitative
benefits”).
449. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 15 (describing that even in states
that offer community service options in lieu of criminal justice debt, practices
vary significantly).
450. See, e.g., Diller supra note 322, at 23 (“In a report from court clerks,
only [sixteen] of [sixty-seven] counties reported converting any mandatory LFOs
imposed in felony cases to community service.”).
451. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 15 n.69 (noting that “research did
not identify any statute authorizing a community service option in North
Carolina, and interviewees indicated that no option is available in practice”).
452. See id. at 17 (describing that such programs allow participants to avoid
financial hardships arising from criminal justice debt until they are released
from prison or locate gainful employment).
453. See id. (reporting that the County also permits participants to seek
approval from the work crew supervisor to volunteer at other locations).
454. Id.
455. Id.

1677

THE NEW PEONAGE

In short, time-limited community service that is directly tied to
job training and placement is a useful model for addressing
criminal justice debt.
V. Conclusion
There are many parallels between the post-Civil War system
of coerced labor for debt and the new form that has developed
with the proliferation of economic sanctions in U.S. courts. 456 The
most obvious, perhaps, is legalized discrimination. Like peonage
in the late nineteenth century, the new peonage marginalizes
large segments of the community, segregates them physically in
jails, prisons, and ghettos, and then authorizes discrimination
against them in the judicial system, with collateral consequences
in areas such as employment, voting, and public benefits. 457 As a
result, Marcus, 458 a Georgia “peon” in the 1880s, and David
Ramirez, 459 living in the 2010s in Washington State, have more
in common than their generational, ethnic, and cultural
differences would suggest.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court issued decisions in the
1910s, and then again in the 1970s and 1980s, that invalidated
laws that perpetuated both forms of peonage, the practice
persists. 460 Ironically, at least in the contemporary context, this
hidden regressive tax frequently fails to generate state
revenue. 461 Instead, it burdens the court system and interferes
with the proper administration of justice. It also contributes to
extreme family hardship, which increases the risk of recidivism
and the intergenerational transmission of poverty. 462
Proposals to end the phenomenon of the new peonage do
exist, and their success has been demonstrated in a variety of
456. See supra Part III.E (comparing the old and new peonage).
457. See supra Part III.E (comparing the old and new peonage).
458. See supra notes 3–17 and accompanying text (explaining Marcus’s life
story).
459. See supra notes 20–31 and accompanying text (describing David
Ramirez’s crippling criminal-justice debt).
460. BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 19.
461. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the impact analysis of fees).
462. See supra Part III.C (discussing collateral consequences on the family).
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laws and programs across the United States. 463 The open
question is whether our legislators and judges have the will to
end this two-tiered system of justice. As the Court stated in
Bearden v. Georgia:
[T]he State argues that its interests in punishing the
lawbreaker and deterring others from criminal behavior
require it to revoke probation for failure to pay a fine or
restitution. The State clearly has an interest in punishment
and deterrence, but this interest can often be served fully by
alternative means. 464

For criminal justice advocates, few issues are more pressing than
working to ensure that America’s current economic caste system
will be its last.

463. See PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 47, at 11–24 (describing criminal debt
reform laws and programs in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Maryland,
Washington, and Florida).
464. 461 U.S. 660, 671–72 (1983).

